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ABSTRACT 
This paper begins with the thesis that an andocentric-assimilation 
model of women’s liberation both has affected workplace outcomes 
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for women and has desensitized us to those outcomes.  The paper 
then applies that thesis to understandings of “equality” within a 
hierarchical framework, arguing that the equality-liberty dichotomy is 
false in the context of gender discrimination in the workplace.  
Instead the paper argues that disparate treatment is a liberty concern.  
In seeking to have our professional fates married to the fates of our 
male colleagues—which is what workplace equality doctrines aim to 
do—women are seeking to be only as free as our male colleagues are 
to find work and to find meaning in our work, to procreate or not, to 
coast along or to stand out, and, if we choose, to stand alone.  
Further, this paper offers the perspective that as feminist advocates we 
should resist the inclination to make our peace with the ordering of 
the gendered paradigms as they stand and to negotiate compromises 
from these vantage points.  Within this theoretical framework, this 
paper explores the implications of the “regulation” versus 
“governance” debate in the context of gender discrimination.  The 
article suggests that renaming and reframing aside, the approach 
embodied by the governance paradigm as it is applied to gender 
discriminatory contexts is neither new nor a deal for those already 
occupying a subordinate bargaining position, but it is instead a 
framework by which to privilege existing power structures and 
efficiency-based values over other values and interests.  Moreover, this 
paper defends the civil rights model of rules-based state-enforced 
mandatory anti-discrimination measures, such as Title VII, as an 
admittedly non-panacean yet nonetheless indispensable means by 
which private gender hierarchies are inhibited.  Finally, this paper 
contends that in looking to the law to inhibit this particular privately-
enforced tyranny, women are correctly interpreting the obligation of 
the state within our constitutional scheme to disrupt private tyrannies 
when those tyrannies reach the point of functioning as class-based 
power monopolies, limiting the fundamental freedoms of those 
outside the monopolist class. 
 
 
* * * 
INTRODUCTION: WOMEN ARE STILL TREATED DIFFERENTLY AT WORK, 
BUT THE ASSIMILATION MODEL HAS HELPED US TO STOP CARING 
A friend of mine, a BigLaw escapee, described to me how she 
suddenly decided to leave her BigLaw firm job in the midst of a 
recruiting lunch.  The story unfolds as follows: she, a second year 
litigation associate, was lunching with her mentee, a first-year male 
litigation associate, and a female law school recruit.  During the first 
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part of the lunch, my friend listened as her mentee truthfully detailed 
for the benefit of the recruit the interesting brief-writing he had done 
during the course of his first year at the firm, as well as the engaging 
issues he had researched, and the points of law he had summarized.  
At the end of this pitch, the female recruit turned politely to my 
friend, the senior attorney at the table, the mentor, the female 
litigator, and asked, “And has your practice been similar?”  In truth, 
my friend, like ninety percent of the women in her class, had spent 
the last two years—in the same litigation department, mind you—
occupied primarily with administrative work rather than legal 
research or analysis.1  As she sat there, in the proverbial hot seat for 
the firm, she suddenly could not imagine why she was engaged in the 
project of recruiting a highly qualified woman candidate to her firm.  
“No,” she replied, gesturing towards her male mentee, “but in a few 
years they may let me work for him.” 
With this indiscretion my friend betrayed the firm’s open secret 
concerning women litigators and the “bad” work.  Apparently, it was 
widely known among both men and women associates at her firm that 
women associates were assigned administrative work while similarly 
situated male associates were assigned more analytically substantive 
work.  As inhabitants of the professional world, do we find this 
anecdote surprising?2  When shopping this story around to other 
                                                          
 1. Cf. J. Stratton Shartel, More Female Litigators Relegated to Non-Trial Work, 
Survey Finds, 9 NO. 2 INSIDE LITIG. 12, 12 (1995) (reporting the results of a survey of 
500 litigation attorneys). 
Male litigators in private practice tend to spend more time at trial than their 
female colleagues, while women litigators spend more of their time on 
non-trial responsibilities such as settlement negotiation and document 
preparation, according to a recent survey of attorneys conducted by Inside 
Litigation. 
The results paint a disheartening picture of an environment in which men 
spend more of their time in the courtroom, reaping the rewards of trial 
experience, favorable verdicts, and high visibility, while women are assigned 
secondary roles, making advancement more difficult. 
Id. 
 2. It should not be surprising.  In fact, in researching this project what is most 
surprising is how remarkably well documented and discussed an experience this is, 
and has been for literally decades.  A disparate treatment researcher could hardly 
swing a dead cat without hitting an array of examples of assignment or promotion 
gender-based disparities at a law firm.  Consider, for example, a similar law firm “case 
study” described by Susan Sturm several years ago: 
A group of women have questioned recent decisions denying women 
promotion to partnership, the firm’s general failure to retain and promote 
women despite comparable entry credentials, and a series of individual 
incidents that triggered complaints of sexual harassment and gender bias.  In 
part because the firm aggressively recruits women at the entry level and fails 
to track patterns in work assignment and promotion, the firm’s management 
has been largely unaware of any problem until these complaints arose.  The 
complaints involved a range of issues: differences in patterns of work 
assignment and training opportunities among men and women; tolerance of 
3
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BigLaw lawyers, it has rarely been received with surprise or disbelief.  
Instead, the tale has often been met with various pragmatic accounts 
for the disparity, frequently along the lines of: “Women leave firms.  
The good work is scarce, and is reserved for those who are more likely 
to stay.”  This explanation, although certainly incomplete, lays bare an 
internalized bottom line that prioritizes efficiency in information costs 
over equal opportunity.  It is efficient, rational, inaccurate, and 
discriminatory, but is it surprising? 
What is surprising, although perhaps it should not be, is that 
people—meaning here, primarily lawyers—are consistently 
underwhelmed when presented with the topic of this decidedly less 
sexy subset of workplace gender discrimination: disparate treatment.  
Disparate treatment, it seems, while widely acknowledged, is no 
longer a problem of stirring concern.  Courteous inquiries 
concerning this project have frequently fronted a look which 
communicates, “Now?  Surely we have finished with that by now—
would you perhaps be better occupied by considering the future of 
Roe?” 
The most striking aspect of this two-pronged incredulity is the latter 
point, the surely-we-are-finished-with-that-by-now point.3  Of course we 
                                                          
a sexualized work environment by partners who are otherwise significant 
“rainmakers”; routine comments by male lawyers, particularly in the 
predominantly male departments, on the appearance, sexuality, and 
competence of women; harsh assessments of women’s capacities and work 
styles based on gender stereotypes; avoidance of work-related contact with 
women by members of particular departments; and hyper-scrutiny of 
women’s performance by some, and the invisibility of women’s contributions 
to others. 
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 470 (2001).  And another strikingly similar 
example: 
Consider, for example, a litigation law firm that promotes almost exclusively 
from within its own ranks.  The hiring partners at the firm have no problem 
hiring women and regularly hire entering classes that are fifty percent 
women.  The partners simply refuse to hire women who they perceive to be 
aggressive, loud, and competitive.  The partners just do not like women with 
these personality traits, preferring women who are a bit more “girly,” giggly, 
and deferential.  They regularly hire women from top law schools who fit this 
mold.  Despite the law firm’s frequent hiring of female associates, very few 
women are invited to join the partnership ranks. In order to become an 
equity partner in the firm, a candidate must have a reputation as a tough and 
aggressive litigator and be able to bring business into the firm.  By the time 
associates reach the firm’s six year up-or-out deadline, significantly fewer 
female associates than male associates have these attributes.  Without any 
discrimination taking place at the time of the partnership decision, far fewer 
women than men are promoted to partner at the firm. 
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument 
Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 227 (2004). 
 3. And least of all among lawyers, whose own experience in the contemporary 
legal workplace, coupled with their exposure to what one hopes was at least a passing 
acquaintanceship with anti-discrimination law during their legal education, should 
4
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are not.  For three decades—more than a generation—men and 
women have worked side by side in legally-mandated gender-
integrated workplaces, and yet women collectively inhabit a markedly 
subordinate sphere in the workforce.4  In fact, so pronounced a 
predictor is gender in determining workplace outcomes for 
identically qualified people that it is difficult to imagine that such 
inequity would be tolerated if the predictive criterion were any other 
immutable quality.5  Yet we are no longer roused at the mention of 
                                                          
result in an heightened awareness that women working in the legal profession get up 
in the morning and go to a different workplace. 
[W]omen comprise about one-half of the ABA-accredited law school 
graduating class but account for only 16.81% of the partners in law firms 
nationwide.  More than half—70.9%—of women lawyers work in private 
practice law firms.  These figures suggest that, relative to total headcounts, 
women attorneys are under-represented among those in partnership.  
Although graduating from law school and being hired as entry-level attorneys 
in adequate numbers during the past decade, women are not remaining with 
their law firm employers as career lawyers who aspire to and achieve 
partnership status. 
Paula Patton, Women Lawyers, Their Status, Influence and Retention in the Legal 
Profession, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 173, 173 (2005).  Consider, too, for 
example, Deborah Rhode’s observations: 
In law, as in life, women are underrepresented at the top and 
overrepresented at the bottom.  Women now account for a majority of law 
school applicants and almost 30% of the profession, but only about 15% of 
federal judges and law firm partners, 10% of law school deans and general 
counsels, and 5% of managing partners of large firms.  Women in legal 
practice make about $20,000 a year less than men, and surveys of law firms 
and corporate counsel salaries have consistently found a significant gender 
gap even among those with similar positions and experience.  Moreover, 
male and female attorneys with similar qualifications do not obtain similar 
positions.  Studies involving thousands of lawyers have found that men are at 
least twice as likely as similarly qualified women to obtain partnership. 
Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem Problem, 30 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1001, 1002-03 (2002) (citations omitted).  Moreover, lest we think 
academia is deemed above the fray: 
The national statistics for women in legal education are bleak: approximately 
26%  of tenured law professors and 17% of law school deans are female.  A 
woman applying for a tenure-track job may have worse odds of being hired 
than a man.  Not only do the statistics reveal that women receive tenure at 
lower rates than men, but they also demonstrate that women are paid less 
than similarly qualified men of the same status and with the same experience.  
Finally, women are hired in teaching jobs off the conventional tenure track, 
in positions such as lecturers and instructors, at higher frequencies than men. 
Mary Elizabeth Basile, False Starts: Harvard Law School’s Efforts Toward Integrating 
Women into the Faculty, 1928-1981, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 143, 143-44 (2005) 
(citations omitted). 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2004) (prohibiting the exclusion of women 
from the workforce based solely on their gender over the last forty years).  Of course, 
women worked outside the home, particularly in non-white collar professions, long 
before Title VII required that they must be permitted the privilege of doing so.  See 
Deborah A. Ballam, Affirmative Action: Purveyor of Preferential Treatment or 
Guarantor of Equal Opportunity? A Call for a “Revisionsing” of Affirmative Action, 18 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 1, 6 (1997) (noting that Title VII’s framers intended for 
women to slowly but surely gain equal opportunity in the workforce after its passage). 
 5. Identically qualified here includes accounting for the presence of children at 
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that glass ceiling we first heard about twenty years ago.6  In truth, we 
have seen the surveys, the studies, the statistics and we know the score: 
as women in the workplace our choices are fewer, our power less, and 
our pay inferior as compared to our similarly situated male 
colleagues.7  Rarely do we set workplace policy, and even when we do, 
the resulting policy is as likely to reflect a “female accommodation” 
model of gender integration—itself an unsatisfactory rendering of 
gender equality—than when a man is in the decision-making chair.8  
When women do make it to the “top,” they most often do so by way of 
                                                          
home.  See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (suggesting that an employer can treat mothers and fathers in a similarly 
discriminatory manner). 
 6. See Christina Del Valle, Glass Ceiling? What Glass Ceiling?, BUS.WK., Oct. 24, 
1994, available at http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1994/b33958.arc.htm 
(stating that only three of ninety-three invited companies showed up to a hearing 
held by the Glass Ceiling Commission); see also Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying 
Employment Discrimination Against African-American Males, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 
76 n.286 (1996) (providing that “the term ‘glass ceiling’ was first used” by Carol 
Hymowitz and Timothy D. Schellhardt of the Wall Street Journal in The Glass 
Ceiling: Why Women Can’t Seem to Break the Invisible Barrier that Blocks Them 
from the Top Jobs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1986, at D1, D4-5). 
7 See INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, THE GENDER WAGE RATIO: WOMEN’S AND 
MEN’S EARNINGS (2005) [hereinafter GENDER WAGE RATIO], http://www.iwpr.org/ 
pdf/C350.pdf (stating that women’s annual earnings are still below men’s); see also 
DANIEL H. WEINBERG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COM., Evidence from Census 
2000 About Earnings by Detailed Occupation for Men and Women (2004) (observing 
the ratio of women’s earnings to men’s earning by percentile in 1999); Nancy J. 
Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in 
Legal Careers, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 27, 35-36 (2005) (explaining that “[t]he 
compensation gap between men and women is not unique to the legal profession 
either). 
Studies of full-time workers conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor show 
a persistent, albeit narrowing, gap in men and women’s earnings.  In 1979, 
when comparable earnings data were first available, women earned about 63 
percent as much as men did.  In 2000, median weekly earnings for female 
full-time wage and salary workers was $491, or 76 percent of the $464 median 
for their male counterparts.  A survey of the members of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (life sciences professionals) 
revealed that men earn almost one-third more than women, $94,000 versus 
$72,000.  The difference is greatest among academic administrators.  The 
report finds “evidence that women are paid less for similar work even when 
type of employer is held constant.”  Gender gaps in compensation are a fact 
of life for professionals on Wall Street as well.  In one study, women earned 
60.5 percent of what their male counterparts earned in 1997.  Finally, a 
Catalyst study of over one thousand men and women senior executives found 
that while only 16 percent of the men surveyed earned less than $200,000 in 
2001, 38 percent of the women reported earning less than $200,000. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, GAINS IN LEARNING, GAPS IN 
EARNINGS: A GUIDE TO STATE AND NAT’L DATA (2004), available at http://www.aauw. 
org/research/statedata (providing that a “typical college-educated woman working 
full time earns $44,200 a year compared to $61,800 for college-educated male 
workers—a difference of $17,600!"). 
8 See Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 
U. CIN. L. REV. 365, 390 (2004) (explaining that employers often construe their 
flexible work arrangements as a “great deal” to women when it may be an expression 
of gender bias rather than a solution). 
6
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the assimilation model.9  They serve as powerful symbols of the 
ultimate achievability of assimilation.10  They remind the rest of us to 
stop our whining and learn to “fit in.”11  Consequently, this is not a 
paper about whether or why women are discriminated against in the 
workforce, insomuch as it is a paper about the ways in which we have 
made our peace with it, and in so doing, the ways in which we have 
settled for temporary membership in a permanent underclass. 
Further, as to the former point, the timing concern, now is an 
admittedly unfashionable time to be concerned with the disparate 
treatment of women in the workplace.12  It is a subtle topic when 
contrasted against our present political climate of near-constant crisis, 
when the future of Title VII itself is precariously moored within its 
ebbing Commerce Clause host, and the promise of an American Age 
of Reason seems to be inexplicitly eluding our collective 
jurisprudential grasp.  From a feminist standpoint, in light of the 
times, the problems of workplace gender equality do little to 
command attention, worried as we are about protecting what we 
perceive to be more fundamental civil liberties.13  Conventional in-
the-trenches wisdom tells us that now is not the time for pressing 
forward with equality-based doctrines.14  Instead, under duress as we 
are, we should compartmentalize our egalitarian goals from our more 
primal liberty concerns, as though discrimination—and at work, of all 
places—fails to implicate first-order autonomy and independence.  
Meanwhile, elsewhere in this same cultural climate, ivory tower voices 
have become increasingly critical of the concept of the civil rights top-
down regulatory model as a tool for shoe horning social inequities 
into egalitarian reformations.15  Concurrently, stalwart principles of 
                                                          
 9. Or its corollary exploitation model, whereby the successful woman capitalizes 
on traditionally misogynistic ideals of femininity.  For a discussion of the assimilation 
model of female liberation, see Meredith Render, Misogyny, Androgyny, and Sexual 
Harassment: Sex Discrimination in a Gender-Deconstructed World, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 99 (2006). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Del Valle, supra note 6. 
 13. See, e.g., Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate: Because of 
Beliefs, Some Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescriptions, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at 
A01 (discussing the current debate over whether a pharmacist’s right to not dispense 
birth control due to personal or religious beliefs conflicts with a woman’s right to 
contraception). 
 14. See Del Valle, supra note 6 (suggesting that few employers even acknowledge 
the problem of the glass ceiling). 
 15. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (voicing skepticism of the conventional 
picture of the judiciary’s counter-majoritarian righter of egalitarian wrongs); MICHAEL 
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 5 (2004) (arguing that constitutional 
interpretation reflects the social and political climate of the times because judges live 
7
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anti-discrimination law in the gender context have been losing rather 
than gaining currency in both the courts and the academy.16  Thus, at 
this particular cultural moment does it seem reasonable to wonder 
“why now?” 
In response to this question, this paper offers an alternative 
framework to the equality-liberty dichotomy, suggesting, or more 
accurately recollecting, that disparate treatment is a liberty concern.  
This paper recalls that in seeking to have our professional fates 
married to the fates of our male colleagues—which is what workplace 
equality doctrines aim to do—women are seeking to be only as free as 
our male colleagues are to find work and to find meaning in our 
work, to procreate or not, to coast along or to stand out, and, if we 
choose, to stand alone.17  The paper contends that this liberty interest 
                                                          
within those cultural times). 
 16. For example, a Ninth Circuit panel recently held that an employer policy 
requiring women, and only women, to wear make-up did not constitute gender 
discrimination under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), because the 
policy imposed grooming requirements on both men and women, and thus did not 
impose an “unequal burden on women.”  Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 
F.3d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 
2005).  The court cited as binding precedent a 1974 Ninth Circuit decision which 
predates Price Waterhouse by more than a decade, and which held that employers 
may impose sex differentiated grooming requirements on employees.  Id. at 1080 
(citing Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1974)).  The court 
reasoned that its 1974 decision was not inconsistent with Price Waterhouse’s 
admonishment against employer policies that require conformity with gender 
stereotypes: 
Although Price Waterhouse held that Title VII bans discrimination against an 
employee on the basis of that employee’s failure to dress and behave 
according to the stereotype corresponding with her gender, it did not 
address the specific question of whether an employer can impose 
sex-differentiated appearance and grooming standards on its male and 
female employees.  Nor have our subsequent cases invalidated the “unequal 
burdens” test as a means of assessing whether sex-differentiated appearance 
standards discriminate on the basis of sex. 
Id. at 1082.  In light of this holding, the problem with Price Waterhouse’s 
recommendation that Ann Hopkins dress more femininely was not that it required 
her to conform to a sex-differentiated standard of dress, but was, instead, that there 
was no evidence on record that male employees were likewise urged to dress in a 
masculine way, should they aspire to ascend through the Price Waterhouse ranks.  
But see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.  Separate (or in this case, only slightly 
more subtlety dubbed, sex-differentiated) but equal lives and breathes in the Ninth 
Circuit, at least for the moment (rehearing en banc has been granted). 
 17. We have concentrated much on what it costs women to bear children when 
they do not want to, but we have considered too little what it costs women not to bear 
children when they do want to.  See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, CREATING A LIFE 86 (2002) 
(providing that forty-nine percent of women over forty who earn more than one-
hundred thousand dollars a year do not have children).  That compares with 
nineteen percent of men in the same category.  Id.  And lest you assume that these 
women chose the life they’re living, only fourteen percent said they had not wanted 
children.  Id.  Choosing between engaging work (or for many women, economic self-
sufficiency of any sort) and children is a Hobson’s choice that men in this culture do 
not face.  It is a gendered dilemma that is not dissimilar to the pre-Roe choice 
between abstinence (to the extent this was possible, given the realities of rape, incest 
8
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continues to be threatened by the proliferating and private hegemony 
of the andocentric paradigm within our hierarchical society.  Further, 
this paper offers the perspective that as egalitarian advocates we ought 
not to ignore the role that androcentricism plays in mapping the 
professional lives of women, simply because we fear we lack the 
political tools or will at present to adequately address it.  We should 
resist the inclination to make our peace with the ordering of the 
gendered paradigms as they stand and to negotiate compromises 
from these vantage points, because in so doing we concede the point 
not that we presently inhabit a subordinate position, but that we are 
subordinate.18 
Moreover, this article explores the gender implications of the 
recently revived regulation versus laissez-fare debate, or as it has been 
recast of late, the New Deal top-down paradigm versus the “Renew 
Deal” governance paradigm.19  The article suggests that renaming 
and reframing aside, the approach embodied by the governance 
paradigm as it is applied to discriminatory contexts is neither new nor 
is it a deal for those already occupying a subordinate bargaining 
position.  It is instead a familiar framework by which to privilege 
existing power structures and efficiency-based values over equality.  
The article contends that moving away from a regulatory model 
functions to abandon the understanding of “equality” at work as a 
function of first order liberty, which, in the view of the author, is a 
mistake for those who carry with them a history of subordination.  
Further, this paper defends the civil rights model of rules-based state-
enforced mandatory anti-discrimination measures, such as Title VII, as 
an admittedly non-panacean yet nonetheless indispensable means by 
which private gendered hierarchies are inhibited.  Finally, this paper 
                                                          
and so forth) or the risks of bearing a child—a choice which men also did not face. 
 18. The concept of gendered paradigms expressed here includes gendered 
expressions and presentation as well as sex. 
 19. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-47 (2004) 
(identifying the emergence of a “new governance paradigm”).  This paradigm is 
synthesized 
from a myriad of recent scholarly theories including the following: “reflexive 
law,” “soft law,” “collaborative governance,” “democratic experimentalism,” 
“responsive regulation,” “outsourcing regulation,” “reconstitutive law,” 
“post-regulatory law,” “revitalizing regulation,” “regulatory pluralism,” 
“decentering regulation,” “meta-regulation,” “contractarian law,” 
“communicative governance,” “negotiated governance,” “destabilization 
rights,” “cooperative implementation,” “interactive compliance,” “public 
laboratories,” “deepened democracy and empowered participatory 
governance,” “pragmatic lawyering,” “nonrival  partnership,” and “a daring 
legal system.” 
Id. (citations omitted).  Professor Lobel supports the newness claim, attributing the 
political pendulum shift of the past five years to a “new reality” to which legal thought 
and practice must “transform themselves to adjust.”  Id. at 357. 
9
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contends that in looking to the law to inhibit this particular private 
tyranny, women are correctly interpreting the obligation of the state 
within our constitutional scheme to disrupt private tyrannies when 
those tyrannies reach the point of functioning as class-based power 
monopolies, limiting the fundamental freedoms of those outside the 
monopolist class. 
This set of arguments is presented in the following format: Part II 
explores ways in which equality can be conceptualized within a 
hierarchical scheme, first by identifying the current dominate 
gendered hierarchy of androcentricism and assimilation, and 
considering the ways in which this hierarchy has affected our 
understanding of the issue of disparate treatment at work.  Next, the 
paper considers the places at which gender “equality” interests 
intersect with the liberty axis and suggests that gender discrimination 
at work is a liberty concern.  Part III of the paper discusses the role 
the state in the regulation of private hierarchies, considers the relative 
merits and drawbacks of the so-called governance model of 
employment law, and ultimately offers an unqualified defense of the 
civil rights model of inhibiting gender discrimination in the 
workplace. 
I.  CONCEPTUALIZING  EQUALITY  IN A HIERARCHICAL SCHEMA 
The use of a hypothetical may assist in humanizing or at least 
solidifying a consideration of what the introduction has threatened 
will be an unfortunate series of -isms and other abstractions.  
Adopting the introductory scenario and folding it into a hypothetical, 
it may look something like this: a class of ten spanking new associates 
enters a litigation firm, each associate clutching to his or her breast an 
excellent transcript and fond memories of an appellate clerkship.  Of 
this class, seven are women and three are men.20  Of the thirty 
associates already at the firm, three are women—a disparity of 
attrition rather than of hiring.  Still, undaunted by this ratio, the seven 
new female hires march confidently into their litigation practices, 
where upon six of them are immediately assigned work on a client 
that requires primarily administrative and oversight work from 
associates.  None of the three men are assigned to this client, and 
during the following year, the men easily lap the women several times 
over in terms of gaining trial and discovery exposure, brief writing 
and other marketable litigation experience.  The disparity here 
concerns assignments, and the hypothetical will assume to isolate that 
                                                          
 20. For the sake of simplicity the hypothetical will assume that none of the new 
hires, male or female, have children. 
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particular, and evidently not uncommon, phenomena.21  Moreover, 
this disparity in experience begins to feed upon itself, as assignments 
that require particular experience become increasingly beyond the 
reach of the female associates.  Predictably, by the end of the class’s 
second year at the firm, two of the original three women associates 
have left, as have five of the seven now second-year female associates.  
But not to worry, law school recruit, the new incoming class is 
comprised of seventy percent women, so things should even out. 
And worry, we do not.  Every year, legions of bright, qualified 
women march into this and countless similar employment situations, 
undaunted by the odds that women statistically face in those 
contexts.22  Certainly part of the reason this happens is less the result 
of a lack of foresight and more the result of a lack of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.23  However, something more happens 
to keep us marching: every now and again at reliable intervals, a 
woman makes it within the system.24  Moreover, when a woman makes 
it, she often makes it big, and it is this beacon of attainability, the 
uber-successful woman within the existing structure—the managing 
partner, the supreme court justice, the CEO, the secretary of state—
which leads us to believe that the structure itself is not flawed and that 
the origin of any failures, statistical or otherwise, lies within ourselves. 
                                                          
 21. Cf. SUSAN NOSSEL & ELIZABETH WESTFALL, PRESUMED EQUAL: WHAT AMERICA’S 
TOP LAWYERS REALLY THINK ABOUT THEIR FIRMS xii (1998).  The survey synthesized 
responses from twelve-hundred women attorneys practicing at law firms that employ 
fifty women attorneys or more.  The survey has been described as demonstrating that 
[c]learly, assignment quality matters.  And some of the women who 
completed the survey said they were shunted into less significant roles when 
male partners were unable to overcome feelings about which duties were 
“appropriate” for women.  In the end, these women felt that their lack of 
exposure to more challenging work hurt their chances at partnership and 
limited hands-on experience gained through client contact. 
Institute of Management and Administration, Inc., What You Can Learn from 
Women Lawyers’ Views of Their Firms, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR LAW OFFICES 
(Apr. 1998). 
 22. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, DIVERSITY IN LAW FIRMS (2003) 
[hereinafter EEOC], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/reports/diversitylaw/ 
#status. 
The average number of women and White male associates in the sample 
firms are nearly identical (37.68 for women and 37.60 for White men). 
However, the mean number of White male partners far exceeds the mean 
number of women partners at 12.71 percent.  The mean odds ratio for this 
comparison is 5.330; clearly not even odds for the two groups. 
Id. 
 23. See Reichman & Sterling, supra note 7, at 35-36 (noting the widespread 
income disparities in all professions). 
 24. See Suzanne Hoppough, Most Powerful Women in Media, FORBES, July 28, 
2005, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2005/07/28/lists-powerfulwomen-media05powo 
m_cz_sh_0728media.html (highlighting several successful businesswomen such as 
Janet Robinson, Marjorie Scardino, and Oprah Winfrey). 
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When the media applauds the superstar, or the woman who has 
survived the odds, it doesn’t take into account the millions who 
continue to live in poverty.  A generation later, the idea of women’s 
full participation in American life brought subtle advances, though 
it is generally no more than mere tokenism which has assuaged the 
consciences of the powerful.25 
In fact, the existence of a minority of highly visible, highly 
successful women does much more than assuage the consciences of 
the powerful, it assuages the concerns of relevant class, it reassures 
women generally that they too could one day be well-placed within 
the hierarchy, and creates a cottage industry of book pushers 
explaining to women how to beat the odds.26  The presence of one or 
two highly placed women partners, for example, reassures the bright-
eyed women recruits in our hypothetical that they are reasonably 
likely to succeed at BigLaw, in a way that simple statistical realities fail 
to vanquish.27  Seeing some women succeed, and succeed so 
dramatically, we are inspired, we are challenged, and we are ready to 
follow in their footsteps.  We are blinded by the brilliance of 
possibility. 
A.  The Current Gender Schematic:  
Cherry-Picking and Trickle-Down 
The facts, nevertheless, counsel circumspection.28  Consider, for 
example, the following: “There are six female CEOs of Fortune 500 
companies, an elite handful who have beaten the odds.  But it is not 
certain they will propel many other women to the top.  Among the 
[twenty-four] best-paid executives working for those six CEOs, only 
three are women.”29 
                                                          
 25. Barbara L. Bernier, Assimilation or Liberation: Post-Modern American 
Women—Speech and Property Law, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 521, 530-31 (2004) 
(asserting further that “[t]he women’s movement suffers from the same problem of 
the civil right’s movement—that is, expecting that assimilation is equivalent to 
liberation as the answer to full citizenship status in America.”). 
 26. For a random and unendorsed selection of sports-themed go-girl literature, 
see RONNA LICHTENBERG, PITCH LIKE A GIRL: HOW A WOMAN CAN BE HERSELF AND STILL 
SUCCEED (Rodale 2005) (1993); GAIL EVANS, PLAY LIKE A MAN, WIN LIKE A WOMAN 
(2000); PAT HEIM & SUSAN K. GOLANT, HARDBALL FOR WOMEN: WINNING AT THE GAME 
OF BUSINESS (1993).  Alternatively there are the sugar-and-spice-and-everything-nice 
themed selections.  See, e.g., KATE WHITE, WHY GOOD GIRLS DON’T GET AHEAD BUT 
GUTSY GIRLS DO (1996); LOIS P. FRANKEL, NICE GIRLS DON’T GET THE CORNER OFFICE: 
101 UNCONSCIOUS MISTAKES WOMEN MAKE THAT SABOTAGE THEIR CAREERS (2004) 
[hereinafter FRANKEL, CORNER OFFICE]; LOIS P. FRANKEL, NICE GIRLS DON’T GET RICH 
(2005). 
 27. EEOC, supra note 22. 
 28. See Patton, supra note 3, at 173; Rhode, supra note 3, at 1002-03; Basile, supra 
note 3, at 143-44; GENDER WAGE RATIO, supra note 7; WEINBERG, supra note 7; 
Reichman & Sterling, supra note 7, at 35; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 7. 
 29. See Del Jones, Few Women Hold Top Executive Jobs, Even When CEOs are 
12
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Under the circumstances, “an elite handful has beaten the odds” 
seems an apt description of these special women who have been 
selected for advancement within a system skewed against them.  In a 
real sense, these odds-beating uber-successful women have received 
the treble scepters of respect, economic autonomy and power in the 
workplace, and their well-placed presence in the workforce 
demonstrates that women—as a category—are not excluded from the 
power structure.  If bias exists, it is not directed against women as a 
class in such a way as to preclude the advancement of all women, just 
most women.  Thus, if bias accounts for disparate gendered outcomes 
at work, it is a bias that is calibrated to detect and prefer certain 
women over others—or, as is posited here, it is a bias that prefers 
some gendered qualities over others. 
The persistence of a handful of elite successes while the 
overwhelming majority of women remain less likely to succeed than 
their male counterparts raises several questions, the first of which is 
why “these particular women?”30  On some level, women who reach 
the top at work have gamed the system.  They have brought to the 
table a degree of desirability that eludes the majority of women.31  Are 
the women who succeed the smartest women?  Are they the most 
hardworking?  Are they the most competent?  Are we dealing here 
with perhaps a genuine American meritocracy?32 
Maybe.  It is possible that in the course of the last thirty years 
women’s physical integration into professional settings previously 
reserved exclusively for men has had the effect of breaking down the 
preexisting hierarchical ordering of gender and, importantly, 
gendered expressions as they relate to issues of workplace 
competence.  It may be the case that gender-indifferent market forces 
                                                          
Female, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/ 
jobcenter/2003-01-26-womenceos_x.htm (explaining that the few companies that are 
run by women do not necessarily promote other women more frequently); see also 
Tristin K Green, Discrimination in the Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural 
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 96 (2003) 
(stating that “[a]lthough white men made up 43% of the workforce, they held 95% to 
97% of the senior manager, vice-president and higher positions in [Fortune 500 
service firms]”). 
 30. Actually, the first is probably, “Why so few women?”  However the question of 
why discrimination persists in the workplace is complex and well exceeds the scope of 
this article.  For an account of the persistence of workplace gendered disparities, see 
Sturm, supra note 2, at 59-60. 
 31. See FRANKEL, CORNER OFFICE, supra note 26, at xiv. 
 32. Perhaps we are, and no considerations presented here forecloses the 
possibility that the most successful women are among the smartest, most 
hardworking, most competent of their peers.  Indeed, they very likely are.  See Event 
Celebrates the Accomplishments of Michigan Women; Michigan Women’s Hall of 
Fame Honors [Ten] New Members, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 17, 2005, available at 
http://releases.usnewswire.com/getrelease.asp?:d=55/55 (listing the ten women 
inductees and their accomplishments). 
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alone are at play in the hiring and promoting of women, and it just 
turns out that ninety-eight percent of women in the workforce are not 
competent to hold positions of significant responsibility.  Or, 
alternatively, any number of other bias-free explanations may account 
for the disparity, including: women chose not to take competitive 
jobs; women make other lifestyle choices; men are less comfortable 
working with women because of the chilling effect of anti-
discrimination laws; and so forth.33 
This paper, however, proposes an alternative explanation 
predicated largely on the theory that the model of female liberation 
that evolved in response to “first generation” gender discriminations 
failed to address the misogynist notions about women underlying the 
initial distributions of power between men and women.34  This 
theory, which I have described in greater detail elsewhere, holds that 
rather than reordering hierarchical gender preferences which held 
women to be inferior to men, the andocentric-assimilation model of 
female liberation allowed women to immigrate from their 
subordinate status insofar as they were (and are) willing and able to 
approximate existing and idealized andocentric norms.35  The theory 
further holds that as a result of this particular evolution of gender 
deconstruction, deeply misogynist notions about feminized women—
that is, women who express or are perceived to embody a gender 
identity which is farther away on the gendered continuum from 
andocentric ideal—persist, and have in fact been aggravated by the 
assimilation model.36  However, the theory holds, post-assimilation, 
these gendered ideas are, ironically, far less identifiable in part 
because they fail to apply to all “women.”37 
The example of our BigLaw hypothetical proves instructive on this 
point.  The firm hires a lot of women—many more women than men.  
The firm is aggressively trying to increase the ratio of female associates 
to male associates, and as an institution it remains sincerely baffled by 
its gender-skewed attrition.  Nonetheless, when the women arrive at 
BigLaw, they are treated differently than their male counterparts, and 
this treatment must be predicated on some perceived difference.  If 
                                                          
 33. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6 
(Magazine), at 42 (announcing that many high-powered women choose to leave work 
when they become mothers because they find it less intense and more fulfilling). 
 34. Sturm, supra note 2, at 466 (stating that “[f]irst generation discrimination 
revolved around deliberate exclusion or subordination based on race or gender”).  
“This form of unequal treatment violated clear and uncontroversial norms of fairness 
and formal equality.”  Id. 
 35. Render, supra note 9. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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we accept for the moment that the otherness associated with most 
women remains tied to pre-assimilation notions about women as a 
category, we can assume that their difference is defined, at least in 
part, in contrast to competency, intelligence and efficacy.38  Thus, 
however competent or intelligent the women litigators may be in spite 
of their otherness, the fact of their otherness nonetheless renders 
them more difficult to identify with, to talk to, and to trust than their 
male colleagues.  Their otherness also presents dangers and 
difficulties in the establishment of nonsexual workplace intimacies, 
bonding and camaraderie.  Gradually, most of them are isolated from 
the good work and the powerful partners.  All but a very few are 
relegated to the back of the proverbial bus. 
From this vantage point, it is not so great a leap to imagine that 
those few women who pass more easily among the partnership 
brotherhood are in some way either self-identified or coded as “less 
different” than the majority of the female associates that hemorrhage 
out of BigLaw every year.  On some level, the women who succeed 
within this model are perceived to embody what it takes to make it at 
BigLaw.  These few women somehow avoid, or at least mitigate, the 
stigma of otherness.  In this light, it seems possible that those women 
who manage to beat the odds do so because they express or are 
perceived to express a gender identity that is more closely aligned 
with the andocentric ideal embraced by BigLaw.  It is possible that 
women who have succeeded within an andro-idealized workplace (as 
compared to other similarly qualified women) have done so, at least 
in part, by complementing rather than challenging andocentric 
norms regarding competency and worth. 
For example, in describing the qualities that facilitated the success 
of a woman who is chairman of a 630 lawyer firm, Lawrence Fish, 
chief executive of Citizens Financial Group observed, “She took a 
corner office, she got a big desk, and she didn’t dress in pastels.”39  In 
other words, in the view of this particular male CEO, the woman he 
describes succeeded by escaping the otherness stigma of being a 
woman and its attendant presumption of incompetence and 
inferiority by eschewing a stereotypically feminized presentation and 
embodying—at least better than a pastel-clad woman would have—the 
existing andro-idealized vision of a successful, competent law firm 
leader.40  Or put more simply: she met with his existing expectations.  
                                                          
 38. Id. 
 39. Kimberly Blanton, Case Study: How Goodwin Procter Won Many of Testa’s 
Law Partners, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2005, at C1. 
 40. Issues of gendered identities, expressions and presentations being laden as 
they are with assumed or implicit judgment and personalized normative and 
emotional responses, it is important to be clear: this article does not assert that 
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In this sense, the possibility that a greater ability or willingness to 
assimilate into existing organizational gendered expectations is 
predictive of relative success within those structures is far from a 
radical critique: those who would succeed within existing structures 
are well-advised to “fit in” to those structures.41 
Of course, fitting into existing social structures and greater 
institutional expectations is not an experience unique to women.  It is 
largely what everyone does at work, it is part of what I do as I present 
these ideas and part of what the reader will do in evaluating them.  It 
is likewise important to emphasize that women who present less 
challenge to existing andro-ideals are not engaged in something 
nefarious or gender treasonous.  This exploration of the implications 
of the success of the assimilation model of female liberation is not 
premised on an implicit “sell-out” indictment of women who have 
succeeded in a discriminatory climate.  The fact that some succeed 
within a model that may be inherently discriminatory does not mean 
that women who do succeed do so to the determent of women who 
do not.  Nor does this paper suppose that women who succeed are 
consciously or unconsciously betraying a mythologically truer version 
                                                          
successful women are more androgynous in their self-presentation, gender-expression 
or gendered identity than their less successful counterparts.  This article posits only 
that the degree to which existing structure privileges movements away from the 
subordinate paradigm should not be ignored, but should instead be considered as 
part of an ongoing dialectic regarding women’s relative subordination. 
 41. Render, supra note 9.  Moreover, not every workplace situation rewards 
female androgyny over femininity, but those which prize femininity in women tend to 
do so because value is placed in those contexts on women employees’ attractiveness to 
patrons or others.  For example, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Jespersen, a 
female casino bartender, objected to her employer’s requirement that she wear make-
up, a requirement which clearly signaled her employer’s preference for a traditionally 
feminine presentation among its women bartenders.  280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D. 
Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 
1061 (9th Cir. 2005).  Jespersen sensibly asserted that the forced-make-up 
requirement was objectionable because “[i]t is exploitive and perpetuates women’s 
roles as sex objects.  [She] believe[d] the Defendant’s policy negatively impact[ed] 
women by portraying them in this stereotypical manner.  She argue[d] that 
Defendant should not treat women like ‘Barbie’ dolls.”  Id. at 1193.  In finding for the 
casino, the trial court did not disagree with Jespersen that the requirement was 
exploitive or objectionable, holding: “Plaintiff is entitled to disagree with and object 
to the means by which Defendant promotes itself and its employees.  Yet even if we 
agree that Defendant’s policy may not be a step forward in freeing women from 
societal stereotypes, it does not convert Defendant’s conduct into unlawful 
discrimination.”  Id. at 1194 (citing Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F.Supp. 905, 
913-14 (D. Nev. 1993) for the principle that making decisions for hiring casino 
dealers based on a preference for “Barbie doll” images is not discriminatory).  
Another possible motivation for preferring feminine women to androgynous women 
in the workplace concerns the desire in an employer to minimize the presence of 
“competent” women by preferring “giggling” women, as this ordering leaves 
unchallenged internalized hierarchy that women occupy a subordinate sphere of 
competency relative to the employer.  However, this ordering of femininity in 
contrast to competency, coupled with a preference for femininity, rarely bodes well 
for the initially preferred women.  See Yuracko, supra note 2, at 227. 
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of themselves, their gendered identities or expressions, or of 
womanhood generally.  Instead, it is the supposition of this paper that 
women’s “true” gendered identities may express along a spectrum, 
which is neither limited nor necessarily informed by their sex.42  It is 
also probable that some number of women who succeed are contra-
model exceptions—that they have succeeded despite presenting 
challenges to andocentric norms, and in so doing they have bested a 
system biased against them without particularly complimenting 
existing norms. 
Whatever account one embraces regarding women on top, the 
persistence of an andocentric-assimilation model in the workplace is 
significant insofar as it continues to exclude most women from the 
dominate power paradigm, and insofar as it fosters preexisting 
misogynistic norms which lie at the heart of women’s continued 
subordination, while simultaneously obscuring that subordination.43 
Moreover, it is this obscuring function that is the central focus of 
the discussion here.  Many if not most scholars writing about gender 
discrimination in the workplace today have identified that the 
problem has evolved beyond “first generation” discrimination 
predicated on formal biases relating to sex.44  Susan Sturm initially 
and persuasively outlined the descriptive framework of “second 
generation discrimination”: 
Second generation claims frequently involve patterns of interaction 
among groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude 
nondominant groups.  This exclusion is difficult to trace directly to 
intentional, discrete actions of particular actors . . . .  [Second 
generation discrimination] is particularly intractable, because the 
participants in the conduct may perceive the same conduct quite 
differently.  Moreover, behavior that appears gender neutral, when 
considered in isolation, may actually produce gender bias when 
connected to broader exclusionary patterns.45 
Similarly, Orly Lobel describes the gender discriminatory problems 
of the “new workplace” as “not the result of a distinct decision to 
discriminate but rather of complex practices, including corporate 
culture, informal norms, networking, training, mentoring and 
evaluation.”46  Thus, the picture of gender discrimination in the 
modern workplace is complex and diffuse, often it is described as a 
                                                          
 42. See Render, supra note 9. 
 43. See id.; see also Yuracko, supra note 2, at 227 (stating that partners prefer to 
hire deferential women for their firm and yet they tend to promote only those who 
are tough and aggressive to the partnership level). 
 44. Sturm, supra note 2, at 459. 
 45. Id. at 468-69. 
 46. Lobel, supra note 19, at 420. 
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collection of individual biases rather than a general or even actual 
bias against women.  Moreover, in this picture of the “new workplace” 
there is a lack of malfeasance with respect to gendered outcomes.  
There is an absence of an intent to discriminate, and there is the 
sense that most system participants genuinely seek solutions to 
problems such as the gendered-attrition problem that our 
hypothetical BigLaw faces. 
But, while the picture of second generation discrimination seems 
observationally accurate—and certainly formal gender restrictions are 
no longer the primary problem—it seems that the universality and 
persistence of gendered treatment and outcomes in workplaces in 
which policy-makers sincerely seek to recruit and foster female 
employees, requires more of an inquiry into the nature of the gender 
bias being enacted in the workplace.  The “why women” question—or 
as it is refined herein, “why some women” or “why these particular 
women”—seems to me to be of great significance in evaluating 
approaches that may best resolve the problem that I do believe most 
participants do genuinely want to resolve. 
But we cannot resolve a discrimination that we have stopped seeing, 
and we certainly cannot know which model will better inhibit gender 
discrimination at work, if we are unclear what we mean when we say 
“gender discrimination.”  Rare is it the workplace that fails to recruit 
or even under-recruit women, and yet women do not succeed on a 
level that is commensurate with that ostensible neutral “equal 
opportunity.”47  A handful of women rocket to the top, and most 
plateau.  Understandably, we have difficulty synthesizing these truths 
into a unifying discriminatory theory.  Still, as a starting place, it is 
worth exploring the degree to which the hierarchical orderings of 
gendered identities and expression has not actually been transcended 
at all, but have instead remained static while the desirability of sex 
diversity has been added to the workplace calculus. 
If it were the case that the andocentric ordering of gendered 
preferences has in fact remained somewhat static but the element of 
the desirability of sex diversity has been added to the employment 
calculus, how would this affect women’s relative experiences and 
successes in a workforce dominated by an andocentric-assimilation 
model?  If the model in question defines competence and attendant 
cluster qualities in contrast to an individual’s distance from andro-
ideals (and assuming again that we live in a social structure in which 
sex diversity is desirable), one might expect to see a minority of 
women who happen to fall within proximity to andro-ideals benefiting 
                                                          
 47. See Patton, supra note 3, at 173 (showing that a majority of female lawyers 
work for a private practice firm and still they are underrepresented as partners). 
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disproportionately from the model; we would also expect to see 
another subset of women who fall anywhere along the gendered 
identity spectrum but who are able to approximate andro-ideals 
benefits; and on the other end of the spectrum, women who exploit 
traditionally misogynistic and subordinating ideals about feminized 
women would “succeed” in a manner of speaking.  If this model were 
the prevailing paradigm, where would that leave most women, 
assuming most women are reluctant to settle for the “success” 
attendant to objectifying feminization and are unable to approximate 
andro-ideals?  Following the model to its logical terminus, it would 
leave a sliver of women in positions of power, a handful of women in 
exploitation-power, and most women in positions of relatively low pay, 
respect, and responsibility. 
Moreover, if this model were silently but significantly molding the 
gendered topography of the workforce, it might too be serving to 
obscure its own role in that process and thereby aiding women in 
making their peace with the existing gendered inequities.  For 
example, the model might serve to obscure its overall subordinating 
effect by clouding the causal effect that an andocentric definition of 
competence and worth has on the choices, options and preferences of 
the subordinate gender paradigm.  Successful actors within this model 
represent false assurance that the powers that be are either “gender-
blind” or that they have a neutral relative valuation of all gendered 
expressions.  It is not about prejudice, the andocentric-assimilation 
model would hold, it is not about hierarchy, it is not about gender at 
all—it is about competence (or an attendant quality).  “And we can 
prove it: our chairman is a woman!  Be competent like the pastel-
avoidant, and this too could be yours.”48  If inequity in outcomes 
                                                          
 48. This may itself sound promising enough to some, but what if an individual is 
not able to “be like” the pastel-avoidant simply by avoiding pastels?  Are egalitarian 
sensibilities satisfied with a definition of competence that also happens to overlap 
with traditional valuations of femininity and masculinity, rendering all women initially 
handicapped until they are able to rebut the presumption that they secretly like pink?  
Twenty years ago andro-assimilation was less closeted, so to speak.  See Beverly G. 
Kempton, The Language of Clothes, WORKING WOMAN, Sept. 1984, at 157 (reporting 
that clothes may help to camouflage a less andro-identified woman as long as she is 
not too attractive). 
Grant McCracken, assistant professor at the University of Guelph, in Ontario, 
Canada, was one of several to seek an answer.  His study told us that recent 
styles indicate a “changed concept of femaleness.”  In addition to still wearing 
the radical feminist ‘uniform,’ women are now striving to create an “authority 
look” in their workwear, an attempt, he explained, “to isolate certain 
symbolic properties of male business clothing and incorporate them into 
female fashion.” 
McCracken hastened to add that this is not simply imitation in “pursuit of greater 
prestige and status.”  Quite the contrary; women are being splendidly tactical.  They 
have mirrored and adapted the concepts of men's wear in the workplace in order to 
“appropriate its expressive qualities.  The object of this undertaking is to give 
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exists, the model might hold, it is because so many women chose not 
to play by the rules, they chose not to work hard, they chose to wear 
pastels, and they chose to spend their time elsewhere. 
However, there is of course both a tautological and an ad hoc 
problem with these claims.  Tautology first: if the model defines 
competence and attendant cluster qualities in contrast to an 
individual’s distance from andro-ideals, it should not be surprising to 
find that most women compare unfavorably to identically qualified 
men.  If BigLaw is assigning an important client to someone with a 
J.D. from Harvard, there may be several choices.  If BigLaw is 
assigning an important client to someone with a J.D. from Harvard 
who embodies a “proactive” attitude, perhaps wholly associated in the 
assigning partner’s mind with maleness, it seems likely that women at 
BigLaw are going to taking a beating from the gate.  Latin second: if 
the model results in disparate treatment and opportunity for women 
in such a way that, to return to our hypothetical, our female 
associates—each of whom labored for seven years in competitive 
educational settings, competed for clerkships, and, like their male 
colleagues, spent on average ten to twelve years preparing for this, 
their jobs—spend their days filing, faxing, and organizing instead of 
brief-writing, researching, and arguing, is it surprising under these 
circumstances, that they may eventually prefer to spend their time 
elsewhere?49  In other words, the model itself may obscure a causal 
relationship between gendered disparate treatment and gendered 
professional choices, while hypothesizing that women are just 
different, they want different things; the difference just is.50 
Another manner in which this model might quietly affect workplace 
outcomes is by presenting a paradigm of false alternatives, thereby 
                                                          
businesswomen new credibility, presence and authority in the business world.”  Does 
this pragmatic, masculine image work?  At the moment, more often than not, it does, 
or so psychologist Thomas F. Cash's research suggested. 
[However] some research disclosed that physical attractiveness can be a 
liability for the woman attempting to move from a secretarial job 
(“appropriate” for one of her sex) to a managerial position traditionally held 
by a man; she is “too feminine,” “too sexy,” in other words, too capricious to 
be taken seriously.  Turn this inside out and behold the woman who has so 
perfected the authority/managerial style that she is seen as threatening, i.e., 
too aggressive. 
 Id. 
 49. This is particularly so if they are especially appreciated and needed 
“elsewhere.”  Cf. Belkin, supra note 33, at 42 (stating that some women are redefining 
success in order to achieve a better balance between family and work).  While this is 
not a paper about disparate child care responsibilities, see generally Lobel, supra note 
19, for a thorough discussion. 
 50. Cf. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 243 
(1989) (noting how sex equality is primarily viewed on the basis of gender as 
difference, rather than as dominance). 
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creating a “fitting in” double bind for women.  First, women who fail 
to fit in under the andocentric competence test may be concurrently 
perceived to be extra-competent at non-analytical, less responsible, 
less engaging, detail-oriented administrative work.  For example, in 
our hypothetical, an andocentric-assimilation reading of the 
assignment disparity might be that women are trusted to do the 
administrative work because they are better at it.  Here, the model 
might understand Associate A to be capable of substantive work, but 
instead the administrative work must be done, and Associate A is in 
possession of a skill set uniquely suited to that work.  Or, gendered 
expectations being what they are, and Associate A’s workplace options 
being what they are, it bothers Associate A less to do the work, so her 
temperament is better suited to that work than a male associate’s 
might be.  Or it bothers the partner less to assign the non-legal work 
to her, either because he perceives her to be especially well suited to 
it, or because he knows her options to be fewer.  In any of the 
scenarios Associate A may be seen as an especially good “fit” with the 
bad work. 
Similarly, women who do meet andocentric expectations of 
competence may be rewarded with—to stay within our example—the 
better work, but if the norm of andro-idealism remains undisturbed, 
those women too will always be playing against a handicap.51  A major 
                                                          
 51. Consider Doris Weichselbaumer’s study on workforce gender discrimination 
published last year.  Doris Weichselbaumer, Is It Sex or Personality? The Impact of 
Sex Stereotypes on Discrimination in Applicant Selection, 30 E. ECON. J. 159 (2004).  
Dr. Weichselbaumer stated that the purpose of the study was to “[investigate] whether 
women have less access to attractive, traditionally male jobs because their 
sex-stereotypical personality does not fit the job.”  Id. at 160. The object of the study 
was to distinguish between plain discriminatory sex selections, such as preferring men 
to women, from circumstances in which the employer actually prefers male gendered 
qualities over those of “a traditional female.”  Id.  Dr. Weichselbaumer hypothesized 
that women are under represented in traditionally masculine jobs—she identifies the 
job of “manager,” by way of example—because employers lack insight into the 
relevant gendered personality traits of an applicant, and as a result employers use sex 
stereotypes to save on information costs, assigning women traditionally feminine 
qualities and men traditionally masculine qualities.  Id. at 167.  Offering the example 
of three equally qualified applicants: a feminine female, a masculine female, and a 
man (no further nuance is necessary in the world of the completely internalized 
andro-ideal), Dr. Weichselbaumer predicts that the inability of the masculine woman 
to communicate her gender identity fluently to the prospective employer will unfairly 
disadvantage her vis-a-vis the male applicant: 
In a situation of incomplete information, where gender identity is not 
observable, the male will receive preferential treatment in a masculine job, 
while the two women will be treated the same.  This is because the employer 
cannot distinguish between the two women.  Masculinity is highly valued in 
the job, but the masculine female cannot be identified as providing the 
required characteristics and suffers statistical discrimination.  In a feminine 
job, however, where feminine characteristics are required, the masculine 
female benefits from statistical discrimination.  Although in fact she would be 
less suited for the job since she is lacking the feminine characteristics, she will 
be treated like the feminine female, because the employer just uses sex as an 
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flaw of  the assimilation model of female liberation is of course that 
even when women are inclined or able to particularly distance 
themselves from the inferiority associated with femininity and express 
along andro-idealized lines, women will never be as ideal as men, 
because the hierarchical preference for an andro-ideal is not only a 
preference for a collection of so-called masculine qualities—although 
that is reflected—it is also a concordant devaluing, or differently 
valuing depending on the context, of the non-maleness of non-males.  
It is a power-based preference, a schematic, in which the dominate 
paradigm of maleness is, all other things being equal, preferred to the 
subordinate paradigm of femaleness.  Inhabitants, of the subordinate 
paradigm, willingly or otherwise, are rewarded for their relative 
proximity to the dominate paradigm, and their value may increase as 
they approach the ideal, but they will, as a matter of simple definition, 
never reach it.52  In this context women are defeated in the framing 
of the question: how like the self is the other?  How is this applicant 
like me?  How does fostering the success of this litigation associate 
                                                          
indicator for gender and expects both to have equivalent personality traits. 
Id. at 166 (emphasis in original).  Thus, Dr. Weichselbaumer identifies the problem 
of sex stereotyping along pro-assimilation lines. She takes care to disaggregate 
gendered qualities from sex itself, and then identifies the primary problem of sex 
stereotyping—as opposed to gendered expression stereotyping which she 
enthusiastically affirms—to be the obstacle it presents to women with the preferred 
“masculine” gender identity or expression, stating: 
If a woman can demonstrate that she does not correspond to her sex 
stereotype and in fact does have the stereotypical personality traits of a man, 
she should be treated like a man.  A woman with identical human capital and 
personality should be equally productive as a man—no other conceivable 
variables might determine productivity apart from knowledge and personality 
traits.  Consequently, she should receive equal treatment.  If such an equal 
treatment is not observable, we argue, discrimination has been documented. 
Id. at 160.  However, in Dr. Weichselbaumer’s view, if a woman is not offered the 
“manager” job because the employer correctly identifies her as a non-masculine 
woman, then discrimination has not occurred.  Id. at 176.  To explore this hypothesis, 
Dr. Weichselbaumer designed a study in which her equally qualified gendered trio 
each apply for both a masculine job expected that the masculine woman would fare 
better than the feminine woman in what she designated the “masculine” job of 
network technician.  Id. at 176-77.  She also expected the masculine woman would 
fare about as well as the male applicant.  Id.  However, the study showed that while 
the masculine female was preferred to the feminine female in the network technician 
setting, the man fared much better than either of them.  Id. at 173.  “From the 117 
enterprises tested, [seventy-three] percent contacted the male applicant, [sixty-three] 
percent the masculine female and [fifty-eight] percent the feminine female for an 
interview.”  Id.  Moreover, while Dr. Weichselbaumer felt it was not significant—
perhaps because she was not considering the possibility that andro-presentation was 
preferred not because the job requires masculine qualities, but because andro-
presentation more closely approximates the andro-ideal—it is worth noting that the 
masculine woman was also slightly preferred to the feminine woman in the 
“feminine” job of secretary.  Id. at 174. 
 52. See id. at 172-74 (showing that while the masculine female fared better than 
the feminine female in a job interview, the masculine man was still preferred over a 
masculine female). 
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validate myself, and my own access to relative privilege? 
Another manner in which the andocentric-assimilation model may 
be skewing views of women’s relative subordination is by perpetuating 
the belief that the actual physical immigration of albeit a small 
number of women into positions of real power has or will result in the 
increased relative valuation of “women” as a category, both because 
the powerful women will carry into those jobs their own higher 
valuation of women generally, and because their positive intercourse 
with men in power will increase the power structure’s valuation of 
women generally.  This belief might be likened to a “trickle-down” 
theory of relative gender empowerment, and as an avenue of access to 
genuine increased power for women generally within the hierarchy, it 
seems unlikely for a number of reasons.  First, and most obviously, it is 
possible that we all, including the women who succeed, have 
internalized the schema described here.  If that is the case, then 
physical immigration of women alone is probably not going to be of 
overwhelming assistance in reordering the paradigms, particularly if 
we remain largely unaware of the subtly gendered nature of the 
hierarchy and therefore we do not carry the tools by which to 
deconstruct relative gender orderings into our professional 
environments.  There is no reason to assume that women, who may 
themselves fall anywhere on the gendered spectrum and who 
themselves operate within the present model, are more likely than 
men to devalue andro-norms and prioritize nonandro-norms.53  
Further, given their successful navigation of the existing gendered 
ordering, women in power have the survivor’s disincentive to decry 
the “gender neutral” paradigm.54  Ultimately, whatever set of likely 
                                                          
 53. See, e.g., Blanton, supra note 39, at C1 (noting that despite being woman-led, 
Goodwin Proctor has a “low ratio of female-to-male partners [that] is typical of large 
law firms: Forty of 217 partners are women, and [nineteen] of 128 equity partners, an 
elite group with ownership in the firm, are women”).  Moreover, the article states that 
Lawrence Casey, an attorney who is representing a former Goodwin associate 
presently suing the firm for gender discrimination has stated that he “has interviewed 
several women attending a legal conference in 2000 who allege that Pisa told an 
audience, in effect, ‘women with children were going to have a hard time getting to 
the top, that it was not realistic for women to have it all.’”  Id.  Ms. Pisa has denied 
making such statements, but whether such a sentiment can be attributed to a 
particular individual, it is hardly a novel idea that for women to succeed within 
existing structures they must adapt to them. Men who succeed within the existing 
structure overwhelmingly have someone else raising their children.  It follows within 
an assimilation-model that women wishing to access the same path must either find 
wives or forego children. 
 54. Consider the observations of “mature [women] career lawyers” reflecting on 
the relationship between assimilation and the attainment of relative power for 
women: “To the extent that women assumed leadership positions, they did so often as 
the ‘token woman,’ champions of gender neutrality typical of this generation of 
pioneer women lawyers who were encouraged to fit in rather than make waves.”  
Reichman & Sterling, supra note 7, at 54. 
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complex psychological and circumstantial reasons, there is little 
evidence to show that women in power are more likely to promote 
other women to positions of power.55  As a result, the promise of the 
andocentric-assimilation model that female immigration will resolve 
existing disparities if we remain patient seems, at present, largely 
illusory. 
Finally, perhaps the most important way in which the andocentric-
assimilation model obscures gender subordination (and thereby 
desensitizes women to that subordination) is by failing to present a 
locus or narrative of blame.  Within this model, both as it functions 
and as it is properly understood, there are no villains or villainesses, 
there is no law to repeal, there is no court ruling to protest, and 
making peace with inequity is easiest when there are no architects of 
oppression at which to take aim.  For example, in the anecdote that 
introduced this piece, the inequity is easily identified as the woman 
litigator reveals the truth about women litigators and the bad work, 
but the oppressor is not.  In our “women litigators” hypothetical, 
there is no law that mandates that men and women are assigned 
substantively different work—indeed there exists a body of law 
proscribing such assignments.  There is no law firm plan or policy 
enforcing this protocol, nor is there an individual partner or 
administrator or even oligarchy who we could ferret out and hold 
singularly responsible for the disparity.  The firm itself cannot be held 
out as a rogue hot-bed of misogynistic preferences—these types of 
gendered outcomes are prevalent in law firms.56  Taking the 
abstraction further, fingering law firms generally, or the legal 
profession in its entirety, also fails to satisfy our narrative need for a 
moustache-twirling villain, women faring as they do about as well in 
law as elsewhere.57  In our hypothetical scenario, there are no 
                                                          
 55. However, there is some evidence.  See, e.g., Grace H. Saltzstein, Female 
Mayors and Women in Municipal Jobs, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 140, 158 (1986) 
(demonstrating that cities with female mayors correlated with an increase in female 
employment, part of which may be attributed to the mayor actively promoting the 
hiring of women). 
 56. See Patton, supra note 3, at 173 (providing data on the under-representation 
of female partners in law firms); see also Rhode, supra note 4, at 1002-03 (noting that 
these gender outcomes are present in various occupations within the legal field); see 
also Reichman & Sterling, supra note 7 (revealing the gap in compensation between 
men and women extends beyond the legal profession). 
 57. Equality-wise, women fare better in law than in some other occupations, and 
also less well than some other occupations.  Also, I would be clear that the use of 
women litigators as a hypothetical category of women experiencing disparate 
treatment at work is not an attempt to speak about or isolate the particular types of 
gendered treatment experienced by women lawyers, which, while an encompassing 
important experiential lessons about a subset of women in the workforce, is also a 
topic which has been thoroughly explored by a number of scholars.  See, e.g., Shelley 
Hammond Provosty, DRI Task Force Examines the Status of Women Litigators at Law 
Firms, 24 No. 7 OF COUNSEL 5 (2005); Sandy Mastro, Courtroom Bias: Gender 
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architects of hierarchical inequity, only adherents. 
Moreover, the lack of an epicenter of injustice is magnified by a 
growing sense of blamelessness in and among its adherents.  The 
gendered outcomes speak for themselves, yet instances of second 
generation discrimination are “frequently difficult to trace directly to 
intentional, discrete actions of particular actors, and might sometimes 
be visible only in the aggregate.  Structures of decision-making, 
opportunity, and power fail to surface these patterns of exclusion, and 
themselves produce differential access and opportunity.”58  In this 
vision of workplace dynamics, gendered outcomes are less the result 
of an intentional systemic desire to suppress the uppity women as they 
are the result of a complex set of shifting conscious and unconscious 
factors and circumstances.59  But as we adopt this amorphous 
understanding of the motivations at play behind the structural 
inequities in opportunity and access, we fail to draw the necessary 
broad and causal conclusions regarding our residual misogynistic 
notions about women and the way these ideas inform both the action 
of structures and decision-making.  In sum, an extremely complex, 
subtle, defuse and variable set of orderings seems to be at work 
behind gender disparities.  But in the broadest possible sense, in the 
pan-historic sense, in the depressed class-wide outcomes sense, and 
the norm-entrenching sense, it may still largely boil down to a 
collective and deferential preference for the alpha, even in the 
absence of a law to that effect. 
                                                          
Discrimination Against Pregnant Litigators, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 155 (2001). 
 58. Sturm, supra note 2, at 460. 
 59. In contrast to the simple animus-based discriminatory theory which accounts 
for the “wrong” of “first generation” discrimination as the deliberate exclusion of 
women, Susan Sturm suggests three possible discriminatory theories which might 
account for the “wrong” of second generation gender discrimination: 
One such theory would apply to decisions or conditions that violate a norm 
of functional, as opposed to formal, equality of treatment.  This theory 
defines discrimination to include differences in treatment based on group 
membership, whether consciously motivated or not, that produce unequal 
outcomes.  Second generation bias could also violate a norm of equal access, 
which defines discrimination to include employment decisions that are 
formally fair but functionally biased in favor of the dominant group by using 
criteria that advantage one group over another for arbitrary reasons, 
meaning reasons that do not advance the articulated goals of the 
employment decision.  A third possibility is that these subtle, exclusionary 
practices violate an antisubordination principle, which itself is a plural 
normative category that could include stereotyping, gender policing, 
undermining women’s competence, or maintaining gender or racial 
hierarchy. 
Depending on the context, one or a combination of these discrimination 
theories may be implicated.  Indeed, aspects of second generation bias 
frequently blend with circumstances that themselves may not violate any 
current legal norm. 
Id. at 473-74 (citations omitted). 
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B.  If to Schema is Human, then Whether to Schema 
 is not the Question 
However, even if it is the case that a societal androcentrism lies 
behind gendered disparate treatment and other gendered outcomes, 
the normative implications of such a system are not self-evident.  Not 
only is it unclear what can be done about it about it given the lack of 
an identifiable agent of oppression, it is also not obvious that anything 
should be done about it.  This lack of obviousness results in part from 
a movement away from a hyper-idealized understanding of human 
intercourse that presumed society could adopt an indifference to 
superficial constructs like gender and race.60  The “even playing field” 
workforce ideal presumed on a very concrete level that all other 
things would indeed be equal—in the gender-indifferent sense.  An 
even playing field is meaningless if when you get there, you find that 
someone has to be the cheerleader and, nothing personal, but you 
are the only one who fits the uniform.61  It was not that the ideal 
misunderstood the inherently subordinating role of cheerleader, it 
was that the model underestimated the recalcitrance of an ordering 
which dictates that someone has to be the quarterback and someone 
has to be cheerleader.  It underestimated the degree to which 
dominance would replicate itself such that actual sex aside, the 
dominate paradigm would continue calling the plays.  In this way, the 
hyper-idealized model envisioned that an absence of gendered 
hierarchy would follow the deconstruction of gender roles, and in 
this, it failed to adequately understand the complexity and persistence 
of hierarchy. 
Increasingly the intricacy and omnipresence of our social 
hierarchies has been a topic of observation and discussion among 
social scientists and policy advocates.  Social scientists explain that 
processing, categorizing and ordering is the manner by which we 
distinguish between wives and hats, and how we decide which to save 
when the house is on fire.62  Intuitively we understand that our 
concept of reality is relational, compartmental, and structured around 
schematics which are necessarily hierarchical as are our organizing 
cognitive processes, and even the processes by which we describe 
those processes.  It may be unrealistic to expect our social evaluations 
                                                          
 60. And in presuming this, presume too that race and gender were superficial 
constructs. 
 61. Other critiques of neutrality are similarly apt here.  For example, an even 
playing field is useless if you can never get there because you have nowhere to leave 
the kids. 
 62. See OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT 20 
(Touchstone 1998) (1970) (explaining how our mental processes involve 
classification and organization). 
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and intercourse to be divorced from these mappings and schema.  
Looking through the long lens of history, it is impossible to ignore 
the prevalence of Caesars and chiefs, slaves, and untouchables, and 
according to Jerry Kang, a look at the present snap-shot of social 
cognitive studies would seem to confirm the inevitability thesis.63  As 
he explains it: 
We employ schemas out of necessity.  Our senses are constantly 
bombarded by environmental stimuli, which must be processed, 
then encoded into memories (short- and/or long-term) in some 
internal representation.  Based on that representation of reality, we 
must respond.  But we drown in information.  Perforce we simplify 
the data stream at every stage of information processing through 
the use of schemas . . . .  To be clear, this most basic process 
operates not only on inanimate objects, such as chairs or bananas, 
but also on human beings.  When we encounter a person, we 
classify that person into numerous social categories, such as gender, 
(dis)ability, age, race, and role.64 
This picture of social hierarchy may prove initially discouraging 
from a feminist standpoint, in part perhaps because of the problem 
presented by the fabled past, alluded to above.  Our most theoretical 
egalitarianism operated implicitly from an expectation that separate 
gendered paradigms might be valued equally in the same context 
followed.  This ideal is distinct from valuing the utility of different 
qualities equally—i.e. valuing women’s nurturing as it is suiting to 
child-rearing as much as we value men’s assertiveness as it relates to 
the board room.  Instead, the most ideal vision of gender equality 
imagined that the concepts of “man” or “woman” would have no 
particular bearing on the concepts of nurturing or assertive or child-
rearer or board member.  There was a supposition that the categories 
could be hollowed out and rendered meaningless, and that once this 
process was complete, previously gender-stratified people would be 
equal.  In this vision, equality of category overlaps largely with 
immateriality of category, which itself folds neatly into indifference to 
category, which began to sound a lot like sameness of category.  But if 
this hyper-idealized picture of an absence of social hierarchy reflects 
an inaccurate or overly simplistic account of human cognition—if we 
must order what we categorize, and categorize what we process, is it 
                                                          
 63. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494 (2005). 
 64. Id. at 1499.  Professor Kang describes the phenomena of “agentic backlash” in 
the context of a gender study as an example of a way in which implicit bias against 
women affects interpretive bias.  The study as he describes it (find this primary 
source) adopts an understanding that bias may be identified when subjects 
misunderstand the “match” between the agentic candidate and the agentic job, 
thereby replicating the implicit biases towards sex-disaggregation and assimilation 
much that way as Dr. Weichselbaumer’s study.  Id. at 1517. 
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realistic to expect gender “equality”—in the indifference sense—amid 
the reality of persisting and discernable gendered differences?65  Even 
if the categories of “men” and “women” are rendered meaningless, 
actual people and their varying embodiments of the qualities 
previously tethered to those categories will continue to live in the 
same places on the hierarchical schematic. 
Given this theoretical picture, it is perhaps a fair question to 
wonder what is wrong with leaving people and their varying 
embodiments of gendered qualities where they presently lie.  Much 
skepticism has been directed to the concept of gendered equality, 
particularly as it veers near sameness, and if there ever was a scholastic 
captain of the gender-sameness ship, few scholars remain on board.66  
For that matter, much skepticism and a full parade of horribles has 
assembled around the concept of “equality” itself as a societal goal, 
equality in these dialogues frequently flanked with an individuality-
crushing homogeny, and other assorted ills at the end of which 
marches the iconic threat of a “wholly centralized” and entirely 
intrusive government.67  Equality within this stream of reasoning is 
either a very silly or a very bad idea.  At worst, it stands in opposition 
to diversity, autonomy, individualized choices, and even principles of 
anti-subordination.68  At best it is an absurdly paternal or hubristic 
account of humanity, failing to account for the fact that people 
possess differing innate abilities, goals, and subjective self-interests.  
To quote Catharine MacKinnon: “on the first day, difference was; on 
the second day, a division was created upon it; on the third day, 
irrational instances of dominance arose.”69  But if indeed gendered 
difference is (even disaggregated as it may be from sex), and if 
someone has to be on top, who is to say that in preferring an andro-
                                                          
 65. Here the concept of “gendered” as opposed to gender (e.g. sex) is important.  
“Gendered” here is used to capture variances in gendered qualities, identities and 
expressions. 
 66. It is interesting to compare queer activists’ struggle with the push-pull 
dilemma of sameness and difference with the heterosexual paradigm referential.  See, 
e.g., FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST 
CONTROVERSY (Edward Stein ed., 1990). 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (striking down a 
federal law for victims of gender motivated violence). 
 68. For a perspective on equality in tension with autonomy, see Martin Shapiro, 
Father and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in THE 
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Blash ed., 1983) 
(comparing the Warren Court to the Burger Court).  For a perspective of equality in 
tension with principles of anti-subordination, see JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE 
THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 15 (1999) (theorizing that the 
gender-neutrality principle in Equal Protection jurisprudence has worked to 
exacerbate rather relieve women’s subordination). 
 69. MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 220. 
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ideal we have crowned the wrong king?70  Adding to the problem of 
conceptualizing equality in a hierarchical schema is the 
uncomfortable acknowledgment that in walling off gender and race—
the two boxes that we have most often collectively determined to 
protect—we are swinging with a terrifically blunt instrument.  In a real 
sense our hierarchical schema appears to function more as a 
delicately calibrated complex logic game, in which qualities and 
combinations of qualities are relatively valued and valued again 
differently in differing contexts.  The qualities which are accorded 
echelon-identifying weight in this game certainly include the 
categorical criteria outlined in Title VII—particularly as these are 
often coarsely used as proxies for the substantive qualities such as 
competence and intelligence—but significant too are the intricate 
qualities that signal not only membership in the broader classes, but 
which inform relative worth within those structures.71  These include 
qualities that concern the package (skin tone, height, weight), and 
the person (gender-expression), and the personality (quality and tone 
of voice), to name just a few.  Moreover, if these qualities too can be 
outcome predictive, how do we determine which of these hierarchies 
are tolerable and which are not?  This is a difficult question with 
answers that must be culled and synthesized from democratic theory, 
political philosophy, social equilibriums, and jurisprudential doctrine.  
The simple answer for the purpose of the discussion here is that in 
terms of suppressing oppressive private hierarchies, immutability plus 
a history of subordination is where it has come out.72  It is not 
intuitively obvious that immutability plus a history of subordination is 
where the line should be drawn, nor do they together comprise a 
wholly determinative criterion.  For example, does weight 
discrimination carry with it a history of subordination?73  What about 
disability?74  What about height?75  Is beauty super-ordinate?76  Is 
                                                          
 70. This is not to suggest that the persistence of social hierarchies dictates that 
one or another gendered paradigm must dominate. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2004). 
 72. This answer is not meant to minimize the importance of the question; a full 
treatment of the issues concerned exceeds the scope of this discussion. 
 73. See generally Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in 
America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004) (evaluating the societal and legal impact of the 
obesity epidemic); Elizabeth Kristen, Addressing the Problem of Weight 
Discrimination in Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 57 (2002) (describing the extent and 
nature of weight-based employment discrimination). 
 74. See generally Lisa A. Montanaro, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the 
Court Get the Hint? Congress’ Attempt to Raise the Status of Persons with Disabilities 
in Equal Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621 (1995) (arguing that Congress did not 
intend to give individuals with disabilities suspect or quasi-suspect class under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 75. See Nicola Persico et al., The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor 
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sexual orientation immutable?77  In drawing these boundaries, bias is 
imposed, hierarchies of oppression are created, and relative 
valuations are entrenched.  It is not a perfect standard nor is it ever 
perfectly applied. 
Nonetheless, and setting aside the factor of immutability for the 
present, the relevance of a history of subordination does provide 
insight into an essential lynch pin to conceptualizing gender equality 
in a hierarchical schema.  If our erstwhile hyper-idealized 
egalitarianism relied too much on sameness and reflected too little on 
hierarchy, at the other end of the egalitarianist spectrum—the more 
world-weary antisubordination end which never underestimates 
hierarchy—we have focused too little on liberty.78  Focusing as 
                                                          
Market Outcomes: The Case of Height, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1019, 1021 (2002) (stating 
that short men earn thirteen percent less than tall men and that by comparison, black 
men earn fifteen percent less than white men). 
 76. See Karen Zakrzewski, The Prevalence of “Look”ism in Hiring Decisions: How 
Federal Law Should be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the 
Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 431, 431-33 (2005) (illustrating the problems 
inherent in workplace appearance discrimination). 
 77. See generally WAYNE R. DYNES, HOMOSEXUALITY: A RESEARCH GUIDE (1987). 
 78. These days, many people are talking about liberty the way people used to talk 
about equality, including perhaps most notably five of the Big Nine.  See Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986), “misapprehended the claim of liberty” presented there and extolled the 
presumption of liberty inherent in our constitutional scheme).  On the liberty wagon, 
the Court held inter-alia that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct.”  Id. at 562.  
The Court also stated that, 
[Petitioners’] right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the 
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.  
“It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty 
which the government may not enter.”  Had those who drew and ratified the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment 
known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have 
been more specific.  They did not presume to have this insight.  They knew 
times can blind us to certain truths and later     generations can see that laws 
once though necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  As the 
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in 
their own search for greater freedom. 
Id. at 578-79 (citations omitted); see also Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s 
Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
2002-2003 21, 21 (Cato Inst. Ctr. for Const’l Stud. ed., 2003) (explaining how the 
Lawrence majority did not protect a right of privacy but protected a liberty right); 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
3-4 (2004) (defending the constitutional doctrine of originalism from a libertarian 
perspective and presenting an outline for understanding the constitution to embody 
a presumption of liberty).  So much has “liberty” become an “it” dialectic, that a few 
years ago Rebecca Brown cleverly dubbed it “the new equality.”  See Rebecca L. 
Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1495-96 (2002) (supporting 
a claim that the egalitarian-minded generally have laid too little claim to the utility of 
liberty-based arguments, particularly where equality-based claims fail to redress 
representational failures).  Nonetheless, this present paper’s focus is on a decidedly 
less pragmatic deconstruction of the equality-liberty, and one which is applied 
particularly to the gender context.  The arguments presented here are not offered to 
participate in the liberty-renaissance, but instead to support the idea that the equality-
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antisubordinationists have on the falseness of self-determination 
within a system that defines the subordinate, we have wandered away 
from an understanding that all allocations of power being relational, 
equality in a hierarchy at best means being as self-determined as other 
people are, being “as free” as the dominate paradigm.  Working in an 
inherently relational model, it is important to resist one’s exclusion 
from the referential, and to continue to object to that exclusion 
because with those objections the subordinate paradigm reaffirms its 
commitment to self-define and reassesses the definition accorded it.79  
With those resistances, objections, and reassessments lays the sole 
hope for a systematic reordering—and in this sense, for real change.  
Yet at the same time, it is important to bear in mind that self-
determination is not an inscrutable concept.  It in fact resides at 
certain places that we can drive to, assuming we can find a sitter.  It 
lives in places like our local polling precinct, our schools, and our 
workplaces.  At these three gates in particular—suffrage, education, 
and access to work—the subordinate paradigm’s autonomy interests 
coalesce with greatest force against society’s competing obligations 
and interests.  That there are other important autonomy concerns 
and egalitarian aspirations for any minority paradigm is beyond 
question.  But without “as much” economic independence, “as much” 
education, and “as much” suffrage as the dominate paradigm, we 
cannot meaningfully access them.80  In contexts where inequality 
implicates self-determination, “equality” begins to be inexorably 
linked to liberty.  It is at these autonomy intersections that the 
concept of “equality” of classes (which are comprised of individuals 
with differing innate abilities, goals, and subjective self-interests) 
within an inherently contextual scheme begins to make sense. 
Moreover, at this juncture in feminist discourse, the intersection of 
the factors discussed above (the persistence of subordinate gendered 
construct and gendered difference; the imperfection of the criteria by 
which we have decided to protect some classes and not others; the 
lack of a locus of blame for gendered outcomes; and the possibility 
that human orderings may be inherently hierarchical) tend to cloud 
the imperative of resisting the present andocentric ordering, making 
its discriminatory impact easy or even desirable to ignore.  We stop, in 
                                                          
liberty dichotomy actually is a false dichotomy in the gender context, particularly in 
the case of disparate treatment at work. 
 79. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 241 (noting that the first task of a 
movement for social change is to face one’s situation and name it).  Moreover, the 
need to self-define so that devalued gendered paradigms may be unshackled is as 
acute as it was when MacKinnon first introduced us to the concept. 
 80. Here, “as much suffrage” is not used in respect to sheer numbers, but in terms 
of the subordinate paradigm’s vote counting as much as the dominate paradigm’s. 
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a real sense, urging the inhibition of gendered outcomes because we 
are no longer certain that we want them to be interrupted.  Maybe we 
want difference to be facilitated, maybe that is what “equality” means 
in the gender context.  Maybe we have to settle for or we should 
embrace separate spheres because in an apples and oranges context, 
it is better to succeed as an apple than to fail as an orange.  Maybe we 
have to chose among the relegated options, and make our peace with 
our choices, because it seems impossible to restructure so complex a 
set of social hierarchies. 
In the ensuing relativist fog it is easy to lose perspective, but here 
women are fortunate to have so solid and proximate a history to 
ground us.  It is helpful in this respect to recall that eighty-five years 
ago women were not permitted to vote in this country,81 that we were 
not educated routinely until about forty years ago,82 and forty-two 
years ago it was permissible to refuse us work.83  We decry the male 
referential, the andro-ideal, and we should, but we should know too 
that when power is involved (and when is it not) equality for the 
subordinate paradigm means, at best, having “as much” structural 
access to power as the dominate paradigm has.  And in this initial step 
we still have a long way to go. 
C.  Discrimination as Tyranny: Gender and the Liberty Axis 
As she stood trial for casting an illegal vote, Susan B. Anthony 
famously said, “Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God.”84  The 
religious implications aside, she framed the issue in a manner that 
many modern feminists have often moved away from: she understood 
the issue of women’s “equality” to be a liberty concern, and she 
understood the disenfranchisement of women to be a tyranny.  Now 
granted Anthony was dealing with the state’s suppression of her vote, 
and the state as a tyrant is a familiar picture.  Also, voting itself evokes 
classically revolutionary drama, tea in harbors and so forth.  But 
Anthony was seeking the right to vote—the contra-constitutional right 
to vote, it must be noted—in a state where other people could vote.  
Hers was both an egalitarian demand and a democratic crisis, the 
denial of which implicated her autonomy in a manner that is so 
painfully obvious that we barely perceive it to be separate from her 
stake in equality.  Yet it is separate.  If Anthony were seeking to vote 
                                                          
 81. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (2000) (providing that women 
gained the right to vote in 1920). 
 82. Id. (detailing history of discrimination against women). 
 83. Title VII was enacted in 1964. 
 84. This quote is from the trial of Susan B. Anthony on the charge of illegal 
voting.  BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS 346 (1999). 
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despite the fact that she failed to meet an age or citizenship 
requirement, hers would be a claim to autonomy only.  But instead, 
Anthony was demanding to do what a man in her place would be free 
to do, and in this way she linked her expectation of freedom to the 
freedom afforded the dominate paradigm.  She expected to be as free 
to vote as a man in her place would be. 
However, in the example of the age or citizenship requirement we 
may see a whirling cyclone of collapsing principles: could not 
Anthony’s hypothetical citizenship claim be recast in the liberty 
dialectic as a demand to be “as free” as a citizen?  Many readers 
perhaps soared off the page from the cusp of this slippery slope.  But 
the answer is, well, no.  Here is where it is essential to recall the 
discussion, at Part II.B, of the difficult question of which potentially 
subordinating hierarchies should be inhibited by the democratic 
collective and which should not.85  This question must always be 
answered first in the context of deciding whether exercises of 
power—either by the state, or by individuals, or oligarchies—will be 
checked or go unchecked.  The answers may change and probably 
will change “[a]s the Constitution endures, [and] persons in every 
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom,”86 but so far we have decided that we will not abide 
tyrannies which are directed at a class that is organized around an 
immutable quality, when that class also carries with it a history of 
subordination.  Thus as to Anthony’s hypothetical claim within our 
present structure: it is not permissible to deny her the vote because 
she is a woman although it would be permissible to deny her the vote 
were she not a citizen. 
If the foregoing Anthony analysis seems complicated in light of its 
intuitively obvious result, unhappy news lies ahead.  Unfortunately for 
those who prefer determinative outcomes, the suffrage example is as 
simple as it gets because few “liberties” and few “equalities” operate as 
a toggle—on or off—in the way that suffrage does.  We know well by 
now that most liberties and equalities slide along a continuum, their 
content defined by tensions and contrasts.  In the anti-discrimination 
context, much thought has been devoted to understanding equality as 
it is in tension with individual freedom, and reconciling that 
                                                          
 85. Yes, there will be hierarchies of oppression, but there will be hierarchies of 
oppression regardless of one’s rendering of these issues.  The point is that we must do 
our best, but we must decide, because in not deciding which hierarchies to interrupt 
and which to not interrupt, we decide too.  Cf. BARNETT, supra note 78, at 22 
(discussing the tension between the nineteenth century progressive movement, 
through which the legislature enacted restrictions on economic activity as well as 
“morals” legislation, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions holding otherwise by 
citing “liberty” interests). 
 86. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. 
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tension.87  Where liberty has been considered in this context, it has 
been considered largely as a means for capturing desirable outcomes 
that elude a rights-base discourse.  Much of this equality-liberty 
dichotomy, particularly of late, has centered roughly on a New 
Deal/civil rights versus Federalism/anti-regulatory framework, the 
substance and relative merit of which will be discussed in greater 
depth in Part III.  For the moment, it is sufficient to consider the 
accuracy of the dichotomy itself.  Is “equality” in a hierarchical 
schema inherently in tension with liberty?  In the interest of 
preserving the possibility that the reader might reach the end of this 
piece within her lifetime, the inquiry is here limited to: is gender 
equality in inherent and particular tension with individual autonomy? 
Consider the following rendering of the dichotomy: 
In [the 1980s], Americans seemed, for the first time since the New 
Deal, deeply divided about the proper relationship between citizens 
and the government.  Shapiro had forecast that division, noting the 
radical opposition between a perspective that the government 
should compensate social, political, and economic underdogs until 
true equality was reached and a perspective that combined, in a 
‘conservative political philosophy,’ a commitment to the autonomy 
and privacy dimensions of individual freedom with aggressive 
definitions of the constitutional principles of separation of powers 
and federalism.88 
So in the broadest sense, the debate has long pitted autonomy 
interests of the-would be discriminator against the public value of 
repairing class-based distributive inequities.  Gender equality falls into 
this celebrated divide between government intervention into private 
autonomy, and the “compensat[ion] of social, political, and economic 
underdogs”89 primarily by way of  Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination by private actors in the work place.90  Title VII itself is 
able to reach private conduct by way of the Commerce Clause.91  The 
Commerce Clause, therefore, is the primary route by which concern 
for gender equality is in “tension” with private orderings, and so it is 
                                                          
 87. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 78. 
 88. See G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. 
REV. 1089, 1154-55 (2005) (analyzing Martin Shapiro’s equality-liberty dichotomy); 
see also Shapiro, supra note 68, at 219 (illustrating the tensions between “hard 
choices over freedom versus equality”). 
 89. White, supra note 88, at 1155. 
 90. See infra Part III (presenting a brief consideration of the constitutionality of 
this particular gendered preference inhibition). 
 91. See U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to regulate 
interstate commerce); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive 
Theory of Legislative History, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1469 (2003) (explaining that 
Congress based its authority to regulate workplace discrimination in the Commerce 
Clause). 
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here that gender meets with autonomy-based flack, most of which is 
directed via federalism at the aggregation principle.92  The resolution 
of those federalism/aggregation arguments is not paramount here, 
but what is important within this discussion is understanding that 
Title VII’s inhibition of gendered hierarchies does not begin to touch 
the places where most of our “private” gendered interactions occur.  
It does not regulate gendered hierarchies in all the important aspects 
and areas of our lives outside of our professional lives.93  It only 
touches that one place where the potential for economic self-
sufficiency resides: work.94 
Therefore, the principle of inhibiting gendered tyrannies only 
significantly burdens private conduct where private tyrannies would 
otherwise threaten women’s access to economic self-sufficiency.  
Where the private-actor-employer would have treated women in a 
manner that did not violate Title VII, then his conduct has not been 
coerced.  Where the private-actor-employer is forced to comply with 
Title VII in contradiction to his autonomous preferences, his 
unregulated preferences would otherwise serve to threaten the ability 
of women, as a class, to access economic self-sufficiency.  Is this 
“tension” really a dichotomy in which all the liberty interests reside 
with the private actor-employer while women’s relative autonomy 
remains unimplicated? 
It depends on one’s conception of liberty.  To begin a discussion of 
the liberty implications of nondiscriminatory access to work, it is 
probably necessary, in light of the times, to make clear that the 
argument which follows is not a bid for women’s piece of the 
proverbial pie.95  This is not a capitalism-as-political philosophy 
                                                          
 92. See, e.g., White, supra note 88. 
 93. Of course to many, this is a failure of the civil rights model.  See discussion 
infra Part III. It is worth noting too that serious “private conduct” regulation concerns 
are not implicated by our current method of inhibiting gender-bias in the other two 
areas identified herein as essential gateways of liberty: education and suffrage.  
Gender-bias in the education context is inhibited by Title IX, which for good or ill 
offers a state action “hook.”  See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2004).  Suffrage of course 
won its own amendment.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1. 
 94. This paper will not address issues that have been ably addressed elsewhere 
concerning the relative valuation, benefits of, and potentially hardwired gendered 
nature of unpaid work disproportionably or traditionally done by women.  See 
generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (arguing for a prioritization of the 
mother-child dyad and public support for the unpaid work of child-rearing); ANN 
CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE 
WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (2001) (arguing that the very necessary work of 
mothers has yet to truly earn our respect). 
 95. Discriminatory treatment (or disparate treatment) and discriminatory access 
to work, while themselves separate concepts, are used here interchangeably in that 
they are both stages of the same wrong, and are both the product of the andocentric-
ideal model.  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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argument.  It is not an argument that confuses free markets with 
personal autonomy, or wealth-access with freedom.  Nor is it a Marxist 
argument, premised on an idea of autonomy which is connected to a 
woman’s ownership of her own labor.  It is an argument about relative 
freedom in an inherently hierarchical schematic.  The premise of the 
argument is that if work is the avenue by which we get the things we 
need to live, then a gender-bias which systemically disadvantages 
women in terms of finding sustaining, meaningful work and keeping 
that work diminishes women’s freedom relative to the freedom of 
non-women.96  Discriminatory treatment at work means women have 
fewer choices regarding how and whether they are educated, where 
and with whom they live, whether they have children, and the manner 
in which their children are raised.  It is also means women have less 
choice about the apportionment of their time in accordance with the 
dictates of their internal lives, choices, for example, regarding the 
amount of their finite time which will be spent with others, with 
avocations, with themselves.  If work is a gateway to relative power in 
our present power structure, then it is essential that women, who as a 
class already occupy a subordinate power position, should be at least 
as free as non-women are to access it directly. 
Particularly, in the present, Vikki Schultz’s writing in 2000 
described with eloquence the non-economic, psychological, and 
spiritual significance of work: 
People need more than money or property: We need life projects.  
We need goals and activities to which we can commit our hearts, 
minds, and bodies.  We need to struggle with our capacities and our 
limits, in sustained ways in stable settings.  We need to work 
alongside others in pursuit of common goals.  We need to feel that 
we are contributing to something larger than ourselves and our 
own families.97 
Professor Schultz’s point is still well taken today, but in our present 
cultural moment as the dominate paradigm pushes more aggressively 
towards the private enforcement of public values, nondiscriminatory 
access to work is not only something that we may need to be fulfilled 
as human beings, it is something that we must have in order to 
participate in a privately ordered system which is largely replacing 
public discourse and regulation.  In the age when the Renew Deal 
looms on the horizon, it is more essential than ever that women 
ensure they have structural access to “as much” as non-women of 
                                                          
 96. Also, this is not an affirmative claim for women to find meaningful or 
sustaining work.  It is an argument that women must have as much claim to finding 
meaningful or sustaining work as non-women. 
 97. Vikki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1928 (2000). 
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whatever currency will stand in for autonomy and power within the 
potentially new “private” paradigm.98  We must be vigilant in tying our 
fates to those who cut the pie, not because pie itself is inherently 
good, but because otherwise we lose our relative say in how it should 
be cut.  If private is the new public, and the new leviathan is less the 
actual government and more a tyrannus-mercatus, then 
nondiscriminatory access to relative power within that system is 
essential to self-determination.  It is about participating in our own 
governance, no less than Susan Anthony’s own fight.  In this sense, 
disparate treatment at work is a liberty concern. 
The introduction of this paper described the liberty interest at stake 
here in terms of the degree to which women are as free as our male 
colleagues are to find work and to find meaning in our work, to 
procreate or not, and, if we choose, to stand alone.  Is this conception 
of the liberty interest at sake for women at work merely rhetorical 
flourish, or does employment particularly intersect with gender in our 
culture in a way that is concrete and instrumental in terms of 
accessing basic autonomies?  Is it possible that gendered-bias has 
affected and continues to affect workplace outcomes such that 
women’s relative freedom to choose to engage in intimate 
relationships or to have children is affected? 
Consider, for example, that “[forty-nine percent] of women over 
[forty] who earn more than [one hundred thousand dollars] a year 
are childless.  That compares with [nineteen percent] of men in the 
same category.  And lest you assume that these women chose the life 
they’re living, only [fourteen percent] said they had not wanted 
children.”99  We have concentrated much on what it costs women to 
bear children when they do not want to, but we have considered too 
little what it costs women not to bear children when they do want to.  
Choosing between engaging work (or for many women, economic 
self-sufficiency of any sort) and children is a Hobson’s choice that 
men in this culture do not face.  As important as autonomy is with 
respect to decisions concerning intimate relationships, how does the 
fact that single women are one hundred percent more likely to live in 
poverty than single men translate into respective liberties?100  If 
                                                          
 98. See generally Lobel, supra note 19. 
 99. HEWLETT, supra note 17. 
 100. Karen Christopher et al., Gender Inequality in Poverty in Affluent Nations: 
The Role of Single Motherhood and the State, in CHILD WELL-BEING IN MODERN 
NATIONS 199, 207 (Vleminkcx, K. & Smeeding, T.M. eds., 2001) (presenting data 
which showed that in all countries except Sweden and France, the single women’s 
poverty figure was one hundred percent higher than men’s). Also, lest this variance 
be attributed to the persistent assumption that single women have more children 
than single men, consider that, 
Single father families are less likely to be poor and these fathers are more 
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statistics like that bear out, then to what degree do gender 
discriminatory aspects of women’s ability to access work affect 
women’s relative ability to stand alone—to be economically 
unindentured to a parent or a partner or the state itself—particularly 
in light of the fact that a central aspect of the long history of women’s 
subordination in this country has revolved around women’s ability to 
escape legally enforced intimate servitudes and access direct power 
through work.101 
And what about our hypothetical women litigators?  How has 
gender-bias within an ostensibly neutral power structure constructed 
an obstacle to their ability to find meaningful work and to find 
meaning in their work?  After years of study and training, how many 
of them will leave private practice, and how many more will leave law 
altogether?  Were those years of study and training an invitation down 
to a road that ultimately leads nowhere?  And, importantly, if we 
shared this parable with women law school applicants upon receipt of 
their applications, would it affect their decision to write that big 
tuition check? 
II. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INHIBITING PRIVATE 
 HIERARCHICAL PREFERENCES 
Catherine MacKinnon famously stated that “feminism has no theory 
of the state.”102  Deborah Rhode likewise observed in 1994 that “the 
state does not occupy a central role in feminist jurisprudence.  Most 
political treatments of the state have had little to say about gender, 
just as most feminist theory about gender has been uninterested in 
conceptual approaches to the state.”103  Ideas of a feminist theory of 
                                                          
likely to be in the paid labor force than female-headed families and 
single-mothers.  However, single father families tend to be poorer and have 
lower labor force participation than married fathers . . . .  Single fathers have 
fewer children than married fathers, but more than single mothers. 
KIRK BLAIR, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION FACT SHEET, SINGLE, CUSTODIAL 
FATHERS, http://ohioline.osu.edu/hyg-fact/5000/5310.html (last visited Feb. 5, 
2006). 
102 This should be apparent, but the word servitude in this sense is used to 
communicate that women previously did not have the choice to stand alone 
economically.  This is not to imply that the women who have other options, but 
nonetheless choose not to work outside the home, are engaged in some form of 
intimate servitude.  Also, Dorothy E. Roberts writes with respect to servitude to the 
state.  See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-
Income Mothers’ Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1029, 1032-35 (2004) (observing the manner in which welfare reform has 
dictated choices for poor women). 
 102. MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 157. 
 103. Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1181 
(1994). 
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the state have followed, many of them good ideas.104  But the project 
of viewing the state through the lens of feminist theory can be 
problematic, in that feminism is a contextual, responsive theory—it is 
a theory about what has happened to women, what is happening to 
women, what should happen to women, and why it should happen 
(here enters those theories of broader application).  Thus, our 
feminism, modern American feminism, is in many ways a product of 
our particular state, because the story of what has happened to 
women here—which informs our theories of what should happen—
occurred within this particular set of organizing principles, with its 
attendant and unique advantages and limitations.  That is not to say it 
lacks broader application by analogy to other contexts, or that our 
feminism is not itself informed by theories of broader application: on 
the contrary.  But our feminism directly applied to a matriarchy (it 
could happen) would make little sense.  So this paper does not offer a 
feminist theory of the state, it merely considers existing structures 
within this state from a feminist perspective. 
Still, in the course of evaluating structures within a state, it may be 
helpful to sketch a vision of the basic obligations of that state, if only 
to establish a framework within which critiques or advocacies can be 
evaluated.  Here, our republic, with its Bill of Rights and separation of 
powers, is arguably a liberal democracy and while a consideration of 
the obligations of a liberal democracy are certainly far beyond the 
scope of this discussion, in the interest of finding a rudimentary place 
to begin a conversation about whether the state should regulate 
gender discrimination in the workplace, it may be useful to posit that, 
among other things, liberal democracies are supposed to protect 
individual autonomy and self-determination.  It follows that, generally 
speaking, when self-determination is imperiled by actors, public or 
private, a liberal democracy is obliged—to some degree—to protect 
individual liberty by disrupting the operation of those oppressions.105  
                                                          
 104. See, e.g., Margaret A. Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 
HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 47, 48 (1997) (analyzing the roles of “public women” and 
“private women”); Karen Knop, Borders of the Imagination: The State in Feminist 
International Law, 38 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 15, 15 (1994) (contending that the 
rigid thinking of many feminists hinders their imagination). 
 105. See IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 30 (1999) (discussing democratic 
“oppositionalism" which concerns dimensions of democracy that have to do with 
resistance to “arbitrary hierarchy and domination”).  For an excellent account of this 
theory and its account of the role of a democratic state in inhibiting private 
subordination, see generally David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. 
L. REV. 1699 (2005).  David Sklansky describes the history of this theory of democracy: 
[Democrats, in the theory of democratic oppositionalism] are driven less by a 
utopian vision than by the conviction that certain existing and unjustified 
forms of domination should be abolished.  There is a long history of viewing 
this leveling impulse as the core of democracy.  Tocqueville, for example, 
thought the democracy he found exemplified in America was first and 
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When the oppressive actor is the state itself, this idea is less 
controversial.  Protecting individual liberty from the potential tyranny 
of the state was evidently on the forefront of the founding fathers’ 
thoughts, as well as on the tip of their quills.  However, the question 
of whether and to what degree the state can or should step in when 
private (as in non-state) power is used in a discriminatory manner is 
less easily conceptualized or resolved. 
For example, when Ollie at Ollie’s Barbeque prefers not to serve 
black customers inside his establishment, Ollie is privately enforcing 
his private racial hierarchy.  The degree to which the state can or 
should impose a different world-view on Ollie—essentially reordering 
by legal mandate the racial hierarchy that Ollie prefers—is not self-
evident.  Similarly, if Ollie decides he prefers not to hire women 
cashiers—perhaps because in his subconscious gendered ordering he 
has unwittingly associated good math skills with men and poor math 
skills with women—should the state through the collective action of 
legislation or the counter-majoritarian action of judicial mandate be 
permitted to second guess Ollie’s ideas about men and women and 
math?  Or should Ollie’s gender preference, which disadvantages 
women, be permitted to stand?  What if Ollie is Wal-Mart?106 
A. Should the State Play a Role in the Regulation of 
 Private Tyrannies? 
In inhibiting discriminatory gender preferences, the state 
necessarily reaches into the presumptively autonomous zone of an 
individual’s private conduct and reorders it.107  Whether we think the 
state should intervene in the example of gender discrimination in the 
                                                          
foremost a matter of “equality of condition[s]”—and, more precisely, a 
matter of sweeping aside the powers and privileges of monarchs and 
aristocrats.  Lincoln famously drew on the same idea when he tied democracy 
to ending slavery: “As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master.  This 
expresses my idea of democracy.  Whatever differs from this, to the extent of 
the difference, is no democracy.”  And when W.B. Gallie identified 
democracy a half-century ago as an “essentially contested concept,” he argued 
that what held the concept together was “a long tradition (perhaps a number 
of historically independent but sufficiently similar traditions) of demands, 
aspirations, revolts and reforms of a common anti-inegalitarian character.”  
The core use of the term democracy, Gallie suggested, was to invoke “certain 
political aspirations which have been embodied in countless slave, peasant, 
national, and middle-class revolts and revolutions, as well as in scores of 
national constitutions and party records and programs”—aspirations that 
were “centered in a demand for increased equality” and were advanced 
against regimes committed to prolonging “gross forms of inequality.” 
Id. at 1803-04 (citations omitted). 
 106. “Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in the world.”  Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 
222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 107. Private here is used in the non-state ordered sense, not in the public/private 
dichotomy sense. 
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workplace which is predicated on a complex set of potentially 
subconscious or at least unintentional andocentric preferences, as is 
suggested herein, largely depends on a number of factors beginning 
with the degree to which we think that andocentric gender 
preferences offend other principles which we hold in high regard.  If 
we determine, for example, that unchecked andocentric gender 
preferences offend notions of egalitarianism which we hold in high 
regard, we may be inclined to advocate for the state to intervene to 
some degree and in some instances.  If we believe that unchecked 
andocentric gender preferences in fact imperil important liberty/self-
determination concerns, as this paper suggests, we may similarly be 
inclined to advocate for the state to intervene to some degree and in 
some instances.  On the other hand, if we find unchecked 
andocentric gender preferences inoffensive, or normatively neutral in 
the grand scheme of things, we may be less interested in seeing the 
state stick its oar into private preferences.  If we hold efficiency in 
particularly high regard, or rights exercised against the state in special 
esteem, we may find the regulation of gendered hierarchies to be less 
appealing, and so forth.108 
It is doubtful that it will come as a surprise to the reader at this 
point in the journey that this paper nurtures the perspective that 
unchecked andocentric gender preferences harm women as a class in 
a way that the state should care about.  This article assumes the 
                                                          
 108. A related question to be considered concerns whether a particular state can 
reach the private conduct—that is, is the particular state in question constrained by 
an expression prohibition or a lack of authority to reach the particular conduct in 
question?  With respect to our state and the gender discrimination considered here, 
there are actually several schools of though bearing on the question of whether our 
state can reach it.  There is a version of the federalism critique, which holds that at 
least the federal branch of the state cannot reach the private discrimination because it 
lacks authority to do so under the Commerce Power or any other enumerated power.  
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000) (holding that the 
Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the ability to enact the Violence Against 
Women Act because it did not regulate an activity that affected interstate commerce).  
Others would argue that Title VII is an appropriate exercise of the Commerce Power 
and therefore our state can reach this conduct if it opts to, which it has.  See, e.g., 
Jeffrey A. Mandell, Comment, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Employee 
Thresholds in Federal Antidiscimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1062 
(2005) (arguing that by basing Title VII in its Commerce Clause power, Congress 
avoided potential claims of unconstitutionality).  Still others would argue that the 
authorization to inhibit the gender hierarchies described herein originates in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that this provision not only 
authorizes state intervention to inhibit private tyrannies, but when coupled with the 
democratic imperative that the state inhibit private tyrannies when those tyrannies 
construct class-based obstacles to fundamental freedoms, these constitutional 
authorizations for action are transformed into a command.  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, 
She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948 (2002) (suggesting a “synthetic reading of the 
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments that is grounded in the history of the 
women suffrage movement”). 
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position that disparate treatment predicated on andocentric ideals 
inhibits women’s relative liberty interests in a way that a liberal 
democracy, and we democrats that comprise it, should collectively try 
to hinder.  In the context of disparate treatment in the workplace, this 
article embraces the value of women’s access to meaningful work over 
other competing and otherwise important values—and most 
particularly over, in this instance, the value of being free to use one’s 
private power (like Ollie’s power to employ) in accordance to one’s 
personal and inherently hierarchical worldview.  In the instance of 
disparate treatment, Ollie’s autonomous employment preferences 
mean less to me than the prospect of correcting a broad-based 
cultural inequity which ultimately (and admittedly not without 
intervening causes) results in single women being one hundred 
percent more likely to live in poverty than single men.109 
Yet before anyone dons a beret and runs headlong towards the 
Bastille, if we set aside for a moment the normative value being 
vindicated, the concept that the state should or even must act to 
interrupt some private but oppressive uses of power is not 
controversial.  For example, in our hypothetical BigLaw figuratively 
shackles its female associates to the administrative work, but if BigLaw 
instead adopted a practice of literally shackling unwilling associates in 
those tiny cell-like offices, it is likely that even the most dogmatic of 
libertarians would agree that the state is obliged to attempt to inhibit 
this use of force.  This may be because the idea of limiting an 
individual’s freedom by force offends norms of autonomy and self-
determination that are central to our understanding of a free society 
as they are outlined in our constitution; or it may be because a state in 
which some are confined while others are free offends norms of 
egalitarianism that are central to our understanding of a free society 
as they are outlined in our constitution; or it may be because by using 
violence to enforce its will, BigLaw is usurping the role of the state as 
a violence-monopolist, and thereby creating a threat to the stability of 
the state and the overall efficiency of its society; or it may be because a 
primary purpose, function or goal of a democracy is to oppose 
“arbitrary hierarchy and domination.”110  Whichever of these views 
one embraces, all converge in agreement that our state is usually 
obliged to inhibit the violent imposition of one individual’s will upon 
another.111  Thus, as a starting place, all agree that some form of 
                                                          
 109. See Christopher, supra note 100, at 207 (providing that fifteen percent of 
single men in the U.S. live in poverty compared to thirty-two percent of single 
women). 
 110. Sklansky, supra note 105, at 1809. 
 111. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, UTOPIA 25 (1974) (arguing that 
the only state necessary is a minimal one that “provide[s] protection for all in its 
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private subordination should be inhibited by the state, and so the 
remainder of the project is determining where the anti-subordination 
line should be drawn. 
Beyond the point of actual violent imposition on a neighbor, of 
course, views diverge as to the degree to which the state is obliged or 
authorized to interrupt private subordination.  Some understand the 
obligation and authorization of the state’s intervention to end with 
violence itself, believing that absent violence, an individual may use 
whatever power he legally possesses to leverage increasingly greater 
advantage of his relative position.112  An unmodified version of this 
dogmatically anti-state interventionist view would hold that in the 
context of our hypothetical, even given the situation that the second-
year women associates are already at an experiential deficit due to 
privately enforced gendered preferences, it is legitimate for 
assignments to be allocated in accordance with gendered preferences, 
and it is also legitimate for the male associates to use their relative 
advantage to continue to attract the plum assignments and increase 
the experiential gender gap.  At the point where the experiential gap 
has effectively rendered the women unqualified for advancement, the 
anti-interventionist would hold that the women should leave—as they 
do both in our hypothetic and in reality of the BigLaw market—which 
may well be acceptable to the anti-interventionist when weighed 
against other values he holds in higher priority. 
Then, on the other hand, there are those who would favor some 
type of intervention to check private gendered hierarchies, which 
result in disparate treatment and outcomes at work.  The question is 
which type of intervention is best.  For the most part, the only system 
that has been in place up until now is the so-called “civil rights” or 
“regulatory model” of dealing with gender discrimination.  In this 
model, private hierarchical preferences are prohibited by law, and 
legal penalties attach to private actors who violate the anti-
discriminatory norms articulated by the statutes/doctrines.  The civil 
rights model represents the dominant model of antidiscrimination 
enforcement, it is the antidiscrimination model, which has taken us 
from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 until the present moment, and it has 
always been controversial. 
B. Governance Versus Regulation:  
Welcome Back to the Machine 
Remember the 1980s?  There was a great deal of fervor foretelling 
                                                          
territory”). 
 112. Id. 
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of the end of “big government” and advocating trickle-down theories 
of distributive justice, amid, generally speaking, rather a lot of Izods.  
Well there are those among us who predict that the recent 
resurrection of up-turned collars on day-glow Izods may be harbingers 
of other things eighties to come.  There is talk of revolution (again) 
in legal discourse, and some are selling the moment as one of “crucial 
. . . renewal and reinvention” and honoring the “analytical tour de 
force” which harkens “a shift from the traditional New Deal 
regulatory” paradigm to the better day of unshackled market forces, 
and increased faith in the corporation-paternus.113  Other voices are 
more temperate, but generally advocates of the governance approach 
tend to see it as a response to a changing world of technology 
innovation, globalization, and the concurrent development of a “new” 
workplace,  while opponents might describe it more politically, 
attributing deregulation successes to a shifting of ideology on the 
bench.  Many advocates and opponents see both opportunity and 
pitfalls within the new deregulation paradigm as it applies to the 
workplace.114  But, they decidedly see it coming.115 
                                                          
 113. Lobel, supra note 19, at 343-44.  Professor Lobel further describes the model: 
The Renew Deal governance model imports features from the organization 
of the market into the public sphere.  At the same time, albeit to a lesser 
degree, it orchestrates the importation of public values into the new 
private-sector economy.  A recurring theme of the new model is that state 
and government agencies should learn from the practices of private 
organizational models and market-based management theories.  The use of 
private firms as an analogy to other social spheres reflects the growing 
opinion that broad developments in the market economy trigger direct 
changes in law.  In many contexts, the interconnections between the object 
of regulation (the economy) and the strategy by which it is regulated (law) 
motivate the push for renewal through the adoption of market practices in 
the public sphere. 
Id. at 365-66 (citations omitted). 
 114. For an overview of both the opportunities and pitfalls within the deregulation 
movement in the employment context, see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of 
the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 322 (2005). 
Self-regulatory processes in which workers participate can introduce 
flexibility and responsiveness into the regulatory regime, and can reduce the 
costs and contentiousness associated with litigation, while promoting the 
internalization of public law norms into the workplace itself.  The problem, 
of course, is that the move toward self-regulation has coincided with a drastic 
decline in unionization, the only legally sanctioned vehicle in the United 
States for employee representation within the firm. 
Id.; see also Sturm, supra note 2, at 470 (describing the pitfalls that arise due to 
subjective decision making); see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the 
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 67 (1997) (outlining normative advantages 
of governance over regulation, while identifying the limited scope of the application 
of negotiated rules). 
 115. See Estlund, supra note 114, at 324 (expressing concern over the decline of 
unions at the same time that deregulation is occurring); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3-7 
(1992) (addressing the pitfalls of deregulation with a theoretical new model called 
responsive regulation, whereby regulations form in response to the specific needs and 
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While there are many versions of the “governance” model as it 
stands in contrast to the “regulatory” model, there are common 
threads throughout.  Advocates of governance as opposed to 
regulation tend to agree that the regulatory model is “hierarchical, 
state-centric, bureaucratic, top-down and expert-driven,” and that its 
primary failing concerns its one-size-fits-all approach to workplace 
problem solving, which produces “fragmentary, piecemeal, and highly 
prescriptive regulatory interventions,” which tend to result in an 
“impossibly complex and tangled web” of rules.116  Moreover, in 
service of the goal of inhibiting—in our context—gender 
discrimination, the regulatory paradigm applies these nonspecific 
piecemeal rules in a manner that makes future applications difficult 
to predict, and in a manner which often misses the point of the value 
which was to be protected.117  In the process of shoving round 
problems into the square holes carved out by courts, the model chills 
innocuous behaviors thereby imposing even greater burdens on 
individual autonomy, and often times aggravating gendered 
disparities.118  Similarly it often produces very inefficient results as 
employers must address potentially discriminatory problems by 
weighing litigation risks rather than modeling results-oriented 
solutions.119 
In contrast, the “governance” model while, again, varied, tends to 
aspire “instead to be more open-textured, participatory, bottom-up, 
consensus-oriented, contextual, flexible, integrative, and 
pragmatic.”120  In many versions of the model it realizes this 
adaptiveness through a “best practices” paradigm of “information 
                                                          
pressure points of an industry). 
 116. Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the 
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474 
(2004). 
 117. Sturm, supra note 2, at 470.  
 118. Id. at 477.  Sturm identifies potentially aggravating applications: 
For example, lawyers may counsel employers to avoid sexual harassment 
problems by discouraging informal or social contact among men and women.  
Of course, this advice fails to achieve the sought-after-status of a legal safe 
harbor, and it undercuts the capacity of preventive action to further the goals 
of equal employment opportunity.  Advice of this character necessarily 
trivializes the problem of sexual harassment.  It defines the scope of the 
problem underinclusively so that the general and fundamental problem of 
women's access and participation remains unaddressed. 
Id. 
 119. Id. at 476.  Sturm states, “In a rule-enforcement process, problems tend to be 
redefined as discrete legal violations with sanctions attached.  Fear of liability for 
violation of ambiguous legal norms induces firms to adopt strategies that reduce the 
short-term risk of legal exposure rather than strategies that address the underlying 
problem.”  Id. 
 120. Karkkainen, supra note 116, at 474. 
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feedback loops [and] benchmarking.”121  The common operational 
theme of the model is a devolution of the litigation model of rights 
enforcement, and the evolution of voluntary compliance with 
antidiscriminatory standards within employment contexts.  Cynthia 
Estlund has described this notoriously difficult to articulate model 
within the employment context, explaining: 
Procedures vary, but they typically involve charging one or more 
employees with overseeing compliance with legal requirements (as 
part or all of their job), and establishing procedures for other 
employees to report apparent violations.  Those programs respond 
in part to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which promise 
mitigation of criminal sentencing for firms with effective internal 
compliance programs.  The Sentencing Guidelines play a minor 
role in the labor and employment arena, where criminal liability 
and prosecution are rare.  But doctrinal developments under the 
employment discrimination laws . . . have played a similar role in 
spurring the growth of internal compliance regimes in the 
employment context.  Both regimes are representative of a legal 
and political climate that has promoted the growth of habits and 
structures of internal compliance across a wide range of regulatory 
arenas.  The existence of these structures has, in turn, enhanced 
the credibility of firms’ demands for more cooperative regulatory 
approaches and for more latitude to self-regulate their labor 
practices.122 
Professor Estlund further observes that the movement to deregulate 
has not “made major inroads on the basic federal labor standards 
statutes themselves.  Still, state and federal regulatory agencies have 
begun to experiment with forms of self-regulation within the confines 
of these command-and-control statutes.”123  Moreover, although 
accounts of the degree to which the implementation of federal 
employment standards should (or would or will) be delegated (or 
deferred) or privately enforced compliance schemes by courts 
(and/or agencies), for the model to realize its maximum 
responsiveness and flexibility-based potential there must be at least 
some form of public relief from the ever-present risk of litigation.  In 
the gender context, if the model indeed arrives in fullest force, we 
should expect some litigation-curbing either in the form of increasing 
doctrinal relief, or EEOC promulgated relief, or possibly even some 
form of Congressional relief amending the current statutory/ 
administrative agency scheme. 
Some employment-egalitarians are cautiously optimistic about the 
                                                          
 121. Id. 
 122. Estlund, supra note 114, at 342 (citations omitted). 
 123. Id. at 342-43. 
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potential application of the model to the employment context.124  For 
example, scholars such as Sturm see opportunity for the greater 
flexibility of the model to provide better workplace outcomes, which 
are clearly not being satisfactorily addressed by the current regulatory 
regime.  Sturm describes the application of a problem-solving 
framework to gendered employment problems: 
[The problem-solving] process identifies the legal and 
organizational dimensions of the problem, encourages 
organizations to gather and share relevant information, builds 
individual and institutional capacity to respond, and helps design 
and evaluate solutions that involve employees who participate in the 
day-to-day patterns that produce bias and exclusion.  An effective 
system of external accountability, including judicial involvement as 
a catalyst, would encourage organizations to identify and correct 
these problems without creating increased exposure to liability, and 
to learn from other organizations that have engaged in similar 
efforts.125 
By way of contrast, a strictly regulatory regime, Sturm contends, 
diverts emphasis and resources away from solving particular workplace 
problems, and towards protecting the employer from liability.  
Moreover, the allocation of resources which must be directed towards 
protecting against liability is so substantial that alternative methods of 
solving gendered workplace problems are rarely explored.  Also, and 
importantly, Sturm views liability-protecting legal commitments often 
to be in conflict with what might otherwise be internally-driven 
solutions to gendered problems.126  Sturm also notes that an 
internally-driven problem-solving regime lacks theoretical grounding 
to broad-based discriminatory problems.  She encapsulates the 
dilemma thusly: “Externally-imposed solutions also founder because 
                                                          
 124. See generally id.; Sturm, supra note 2. 
 125. Sturm, supra note 2, at 475. 
 126. Id. at 475-76. 
Under the current system, employers producing information that reveals 
problems or patterns of exclusion increase the likelihood that they will be 
sued.  Thus, lawyers counsel clients not to collect data that could reveal racial 
or gender problems or to engage in self-evaluation, because that information 
could be used to establish a plaintiff's case. 
Id.  However, this particular example illustrates less a problem with the regulatory 
approach, and more the tension within particular companies between the value of 
gender equality and other competing values.  If a company compiles information 
regarding gender discrimination and does not act on that information, the data 
becomes a liability.  Of course, in failing to act where a discriminatory pattern exists 
also exposes the company to liability.  But where the company compiles the data and 
takes steps to remedy the problem, as it should, then its exposure to liability is less 
than it would have been without collecting the data.  The problem is not that the 
company may be unjustly punished for trying to learn about its gendered practices, 
the problems is that the company may learn about its gendered practices and chose 
not to act. 
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they cannot be sufficiently sensitive to context or integrated into the 
day-to-day practice that shapes their implementation.  Yet, 
internally-generated solutions are often insufficiently attentive to their 
normative implications, or to the connection between those local 
practices and the general antidiscrimination norm.”127 
This statement perhaps best isolates the choices that egalitarian-
minded advocates face in assessing the possibilities and pitfalls of 
scaling back employer liability in the context of gender 
discrimination.  On the one hand, the regulatory approach is 
insensitive to particular employment situations and often poorly 
tailored to specific problems.  On the other hand, an internally-driven 
system which is not directed at addressing systemic inequities or 
fostering less misogynistic notions about women will not address those 
inequities or foster those norms. 
The question then becomes whether we should primarily be trying 
to address the employment problems of individual women in their 
specific contexts, or if we should be trying to create system change 
through the enforcement of uniform norms.  Sturm believes that we 
can do both if we are open to the possibilities of the governance 
model, while retaining mandatory procedural safeguards such as 
third-party disinterested monitors to oversee compliance with federal 
baselines.  If these procedural safeguards could be effectively utilized, 
the innovative and adaptive nature of the model could better respond 
to the particularized needs of women in specific employment contexts 
while not comprising the overall goals of anti-discrimination measures 
if these problems stem from a systemic, broad-based and complex set 
of biases directed against gendered qualities.128  This would be 
wonderful.  It would be wonderful if individual employment problems 
could be more efficiently and effectively resolved without 
compromising the ability of federal regulation to promote broad-
based anti-discrimination norms. 
However, one of the potential problems of an approach that 
attempts to retain federal baseline prohibitions against “gender 
discrimination” yet allows employers or third-party moderators to 
ensure compliance with those guidelines is that it presents something 
of a “hydra” dilemma.  “Guidelines” or baselines or whatever set of 
norms we institute and avoid calling rules must be interpreted.  The 
problem of interpretation is a central aspect of the regulation 
model—it is perhaps the primary aspect of the model that makes it so 
unresponsive and burdensome—but it is also a problem that simply 
                                                          
 127. Id. at 475-76. 
 128. Id. 
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cannot be severed from any system in which there are baseline 
antidiscriminatory standards.  To have a baseline means to have a 
substantive understanding of permissible behaviors.  Under a 
governance model, the problem of substantively interpreting and 
applying those standards remains the same, but the responsibility of 
resolving that problem is simply relocated to different actors. 
Who then should define the substance of norms relating to gender 
equality?  This question returns us again to the issue of what we are 
trying to achieve with anti-discrimination measures.  If we are trying to 
solve individual employers’ problems, then individual employers or 
their compliance teams may well be the most competent people to 
decide what does and what does not constitute discrimination.  
However, if we are trying to redress the fact that individual employers 
evidence a preference or andocentric ideals, then individual 
employers may not be the go-to guys regarding defining 
discrimination.  More: if we are trying to eradicate a situation in which 
single women are one hundred percent more likely to live in poverty 
than single men, then BigLaw’s voluntary compliance team may not 
be the most sensible place to begin.  And in terms of transferring the 
responsibility of defining the substantive parameters of anti-
discrimination measures from the courts to third parties or other 
actors, ultimately and unfortunately for women, we must recall here 
who is sitting at that decision-making table of the third-party monitor 
or the voluntary compliance team.  Women are underrepresented in 
positions of power in virtually every employment situation in which 
governance would replace regulation.129  When we are talking about a 
system of substantive gate keeping that controls women’s access to 
fundamental liberties, are we comfortable leaving that responsibility 
in the hands of the same hierarchical dynamic that constructed the 
disparity initially? 
Here, the significance of identifying the nature of bias that 
accounts for second generation gender discrimination becomes clear.  
If, as this paper posits, an andocentric-assimilation model of female 
liberation accounts—at least to a significant degree—for the disparate 
employment outcomes that exist within our current model, and if it 
follows that employers are both largely unaware of their own 
andocentric preferences and the manner in which these preferences 
lead to disparate treatment and ultimately disparate outcomes for 
most women—then a model which is directed at solving individual 
workplace problems is much less likely to address and compensate for 
those preferences.  Instead, within a system where the bias is already 
                                                          
 129. See Jones, supra note 29. 
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thoroughly obscured, a model which moves away from objective and 
broad analysis directed at the manner in which BigLaw (to return to 
our example) treats all female associates as compared to all male 
associates is unlikely to capture the problem at BigLaw.  An 
individualized inquiry into each woman’s experience at BigLaw fails 
to create a discriminatory picture.  My friend, for example, who 
opened our tale was assigned administrative work.  No one told her 
this was because she was a woman, and likely no one in power at 
BigLaw—including the assigning partner—consciously thought it was 
“because” she was a woman.  Indeed, my friend might not have 
thought this except that she had the example of all the other equally 
qualified men and women associates to give her particular situation 
context.  To solve the problem at BigLaw, one has to be willing see it 
within its larger framework—to see that something is afoot with 
respect to women and assignments. 
Also, to solve the problem at BigLaw, one has to agree that there is 
a problem.  To the extent that BigLaw fails to identify that the 
assigning process is gendered—finding instead, for example, that 
each individual associate was a particularly good fit with the bad work 
for a reason that they can not only articulate, but that they believe—it 
will be difficult for BigLaw to craft a solution that address BigLaw’s 
gender preferences.  BigLaw sees the problem from the inside and is 
confident that on an individual level, no one is acting out of an 
animus directed against women as a class.  However, under the 
regulatory model, BigLaw cannot be satisfied that it is not acting out 
of misogynist impulse.  Under the regulatory model, BigLaw has to 
worry about what a judge or a jury may think of the facts of the 
situation from the outside: all of the women and none of the men 
doing the bad work; an incredibly high female attrition rate; 
remarkably few women partners.  Whether BigLaw ever confronts its 
internalized andocentric preferences, the regulatory model forces 
BigLaw to be afraid of disparate outcomes, which is incredibly 
important for women given the illusiveness of this particular bias. 
In this sense, one of the primary social goods of antidiscrimination 
law in the gender context is not its ability to solve particular workplace 
problems for particular women, or particular employment sectors, or 
even particular markets, but is instead in its ability to respond 
meaningfully to nonparticularized, broad-based, and systemic 
problems like those posed by the andocentric-assimilation paradigm 
of gendered preferences.  In the gender context, antidiscrimination 
law’s primarily strength lies in the threat of liability attached to 
outcomes and appearances, rather than subjective intent.  In other 
words it is the inefficiency of this very inefficient body of law that 
provides its primary benefit to women living in a patriarchy.  It is the 
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broader application of articulated principles, and their attendant 
inflexibility and lack of responsiveness, that allows the fast-paced 
evolution of the doctrine to account for and address inter alia: 
disparities in bargaining positions; the sometimes absence of 
economic alternatives or other market-based corrections; the often 
unintentional or unconscious nature of the imposition of hierarchical 
preferences; and the frequently self-sustaining systems of oppression 
the imposition of those preferences erect.  In other words, the critics 
are correct that the model is over-inclusive, and under-inclusive, that 
it fails to account for individual variances, and to conform to the 
particulars of particularized contexts, that it offers vague guidelines 
and unpredictable future outcomes which have a chilling effect and 
which inevitably spawn poorly tailored internal corrections.  These are 
its strengths.130 
However the critics are not right that the model discourages or 
tramples innovation.  The pro-governance discourse itself empirically 
denies this claim.  All accounts of the model point to the fact that the 
private sector is already engaged in the projects of innovative problem 
solving, the appointment of compliance teams, and the business of 
serious self-regulation.  Moreover, the regulatory model does not 
target these experiments in innovative compliance.  The regulatory 
model assesses and potentially punishes the results of the employment 
laboratories only within the same imperfect machinery that it regards 
all efforts at compliance: where the experiments trigger systemic 
oppressions, the hulking regulatory system will try to punish, and 
where these concerns are not triggered, the regulatory model is 
indifferent to the efforts of experimental compliance.  Further, the 
governance model itself recognizes that in the absence of punishment 
(so where their experiment did not run afoul with basic norms), 
innovation is its own reward—which is why the trend towards self-
regulation already exists within the regulatory framework.  Whether 
                                                          
 130. Another strength of the regulatory system is that it places the control over 
whether BigLaw is likely to care about a particular problem in the hands of the 
individual is affected by that problem. In the absence of the threat of litigation, many 
scholars have argued that market-driven forces will encourage individual employers to 
seek solutions to particular problems, which could be true.  But, under that system of 
incentives, if an individual employee faces a bias-based problem that the market for 
whatever reason fails to care about or correct for, then BigLaw has little incentive to 
craft a solution.  In contrast, under the regulatory model, where an individual 
employee faces a bias-based problem, she can still seek direct redress from BigLaw.  
However, if the problem is one that the market does not correct for, or BigLaw 
otherwise does not care about it, the employee can insist that BigLaw respond, if only 
by investigating the legitimacy of her complaint due to the implicit threat of 
litigation.  Under the regulatory model, the employee is not beholden to BigLaw or 
compliance teams, or third party arbitrators to recognize her problem as one that 
merits redress, and in this way she retains an important degree of control over the 
process. 
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these trends reflect an effort either to shield itself from litigation 
burdens or to build stronger, more humane, or more competitive 
businesses, they are not bad trends.  They are experimental, they are 
interesting, and they may even turn out to be better problem-solvers.  
They are fine compliments to existing protections.  But make no 
mistake: they are not a substitute. 
C. Working it out Together (While Carrying a Big Stick):  
The Value of the Civil Rights Model 
Certainly it must be worked out together.  Even on the most 
abstract level, there is of course no alternative.  Even within the 
regulatory model, broad-based rules and articulations of principle 
must be applied by people, and therefore most of the decisions that 
affect our daily lives and overall prospects in the workplace are arrived 
at through individualized interpretations and applications.  In this, it 
is also helpful that we may start from the proposition that, again, 
there are no moustache twirling villains to be vanquished here.  
Rarely is the problem one of determined policy.  We may start from 
the premise that most of the working it out will occur between fair-
minded, well-meaning colleagues.  The rules are a floor; a framework, 
a fire escape that reaches two-thirds of the way to the ground.  From 
there we jump and rely on the kindness of strangers, the hope of 
gender immigration, and the power of our basically egalitarian-
inclined culture, and the distant prospect of future court 
appointments: and longevity of memory—we rely on that as well. 
I, for example, remember that Sandra Day O’Connor graduated law 
school in 1952,131 and yet when my father graduated law school 
twenty-five years later there were four women in his class.  Four.  I 
graduated in a class that was fifty-four percent female.  What 
happened in the generation that separates my father and I, that failed 
to happen during preceding generations—for example, during the 
generation in which women got the vote, or in the one in which Rosie 
the Riveter marched into the factory and home again, during the 
relative sexual liberties of the 1920s or the cultural deconstructions of 
the 1960s?132  Reed v. Reed happened.133  Griswold happened.134  
                                                          
 131. See Brenda Kruse, Comment, Women of the Highest Court: Does Gender or 
Personal Life Experiences Influence Their Opinions, 36 TOL. L. REV. 995, 999 (2005) 
(providing that when Justice O’Connor graduated from Stanford in 1952, she was 
unable to find work in the private sector despite great academic achievement). 
 132. See Jennifer E. Sturiale, The Passage of Community Property Laws, 1939-
1947: Was “More than Money” Involved?, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 213, 232 (2005) 
(explaining that Rosie the Riveter was a government created character used to 
encourage World War II women to join the workforce). 
 133. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (overturning an Idaho statute that preferred men over 
women as estate administrators). 
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Title VII happened.  Civil rights law happened. 
For example, in 1984, a woman named Hishon walked into a 
federal court to court to challenge King & Spalding’s informal 
practice of never inviting women to be partners.135  Prior to the 
enactment of Title VII, Hishon would have pled that the practice was 
unfair.  In 1984 she was able to describe it as illegal.  Is it possible that 
we should forget the difference this makes?136  It is the difference 
between asking hat in hand for equal consideration in the face of 
broad-based institutional preferences to the contrary, and requesting 
one’s due with the full force of the law standing silently behind you.  
The civil rights model makes manifest the difference between 
subordinate and equal. 
Yet, it is not a perfect model.  It is certainly, certainly not the most 
efficient model that might be adopted.  It is over-inclusive and it is 
under-inclusive.  It fails to account for individual variances, and to 
conform to the particulars of particularized contexts.  It offers vague 
guidelines and unpredictable future outcomes which have a chilling 
effect and which spawn poorly tailored internal corrections.  It has 
failed to eradicate gender prejudice from the hearts of men (and 
women).  It is not a perfect model, and like every hero, it becomes a 
bore at last.137  For example, sixteen years after the Hishon decision, 
at the turn of a new century the New Jersey Supreme Court wryly 
observed: 
Women were perhaps overly sanguine in 1984 following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding, holding 
that women could claim bias in partnership decisions by employers.  
Some said that the decision “proclaimed the end of the ‘old boys’ 
network.”  Apparently not so.  Old habits die hard.  While Hishon’s 
suit was pending in the Supreme Court, it was reported that the 
firm considered holding a wet t-shirt contest for the firm’s summer 
associates.138 
                                                          
 134. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that state law 
forbidding birth control use was unconstitutional). 
 135. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
 136. See Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Legal & Political Perspectives on the Battle 
over Same-Sex Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 13 (2005). 
The campaign for women’s rights hit its stride when its advocates adopted the 
NAACP’s model and pursued two interconnected litigation strategies.  First, 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) lawyers adopted a step-by-step 
approach aimed at persuading judges that gender discrimination was 
analogous to racial discrimination and, therefore, deserved heightened 
constitutional scrutiny. 
Id. 
 137. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Uses of Great Men, in REPRESENTATIVE MEN (1850). 
 138. Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,164 N.J. 38, 38 n.10 (2000) (refraining 
from actually criticizing the civil rights model, but stating this as an example of the 
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Old habits die hard.  But do we imagine for a moment that women 
at King & Spalding were better off when they were never considered 
for partnerships and they were inducted into wet t-shirt contests?  Old 
habits indeed die hard.  Twenty-one years ago, King & Spalding was in 
the habit of never inviting women to be partners.139  Thirty-three 
years ago Harvard Law School was in the habit of never hiring women 
as tenured faculty.140  Eighty-five years ago our own democratic 
experiment was in the habit of never allowing women to cast a 
ballot.141  Old habits die hard, but they do, eventually, die—
particularly with the assistance of a state-issued mandate. 
And finally, the women litigators: what of the failure of the rules-
based model to address their discrimination issue?  They have two 
choices in this model.  They could sue—they may win, and in the 
evolving jurisprudential climate, they may lose.  If they win, firms will 
be forced to be afraid to be indifferent to gender disparities in 
assignments, and that particular manifestation of the andocentric-
assimilation model will likely be improved.  If they lose, the protection 
of the chilling effect of the unresolved question of gendered-
assignments will be lost and that particular problem may be 
aggravated. 
Alternatively, the women litigators could, right now, without de-
regulation and within the regulatory model, try to negotiate with their 
respective firms’ administrations a better, fairer, less discriminatory 
method of assignment allocation.  This route, too, might result in a 
solution to their problem and likely even a better solution for these 
particular women than a law suit would render.  The powers that be 
well might be motivated to tailor a remedy to their complaint, and if 
that happens, it seems likely that the tailored resolution will redress 
the particulars of the issues these women raise.  It may happen that 
BigLaw will be moved to negotiate with the women litigators—these 
otherwise fully fungible workers, whom BigLaw has hired knowing 
their tenure is statistically likely to be brief.  But if it happens that 
BigLaw is motivated to negotiate with these women, it will be because 
when they come to the table they stand there holding a big, silent, 
motivating stick.  BigLaw will have to decide whether it would be 
                                                          
persistent observation that despite important legal victories, sexism itself has failed to 
disappear). 
 139. In 2003, thirty-five of King & Spalding’s two hundred partners were women.  
See Sarah Rubenstein, A First for Law Firm King & Spalding, ATLANTA BUSINESS 
CHRONICLE, May 16-22, 2003 http://kslaw.com/library/pdf/tandyarticle.pdf. 
 140. See Basile, supra note 3, at 144 (noting that today, women comprise sixteen 
percent of Harvard Law School’s tenured faculty). 
 141. Today one hundred percent of qualified women are permitted to vote, more 
or less.  U.S. CONT. amend. XIX. 
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more efficient to change their discriminatory practice or roll the dice 
on an unfavorable ruling.  On the other hand, absent a complaint by 
an individual employee with the specific threat of litigation behind it, 
in BigLaw’s view it has been more efficient for the last decade to allow 
women associates to hemorrhage out, and hire new ones than to solve 
its gendered attrition problem.  So no, the civil rights model is not a 
perfect system, but the burden of a vast majority of its imperfections 
fall against efficiency, not equality or liberty; they fall against the 
employer, not the employed; they fall against the machine rather than 
the women within it. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the prevalence of the andocentric-assimilation paradigm, and 
a workforce landscape in which women are underrepresented in 
positions of power, women are better served by an antidiscrimination 
model which stresses the ad hoc application of broad-based rules, the 
substance of which are defined by an unpredictable neutral arbitrator.  
In other words, we are better served by the regulatory system we have 
spent the better part of the last thirty-five years building.  That is not 
to say that more cannot be done or should not be done or that 
innovation has no place solving problems presented by the current 
ordering of gendered preferences.  It is only to say that “new” ideas 
and applications can sometimes be additional ideas and applications, 
they need not always be prefaced with a ceremonial burning of the 
bridge that got us this far.  We should not allow existing protections to 
recede.  Instead, we should work to understand the nature of the 
gendered biases that continue to color our professional opportunities 
and advocate for those new ideas about discrimination to transform 
our ever-evolving gendered norms.  Finally, at a cultural moment in 
which andocentric norms remain unchecked and in which we seem to 
confuse increasingly capitalism with democracy and unfettered 
markets with liberty, to conclude that women’s own big sticks would 
be more sagely wielded by tyrannus-mercatus, is, I think, a mistake.  
Speaking for myself, I’ll keep the stick. 
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